Minnesota Property & Casualty Insurance License, Practice Exams

Under PAP Part D, the deductible:

1. Applies once to the entire policy term
2. Only applies to liability claims
3. Is the amount of loss the insured retains before the insurer pays ✓
4. Is the amount the insurer pays before the insured contributes

Why: The deductible is the portion of a physical damage loss the insured pays out of pocket before the insurer pays the remainder.

A woman is injured while driving her own car, which carries uninsured motorist limits of $50,000. Her husband's separate policy on his own car carries $250,000. She argues that because she is an insured under both, she may claim on whichever she chooses.

1. She may claim on either: both policies insure her, and where two coverages apply to the same loss the claimant elects between them, the insurer that pays being left to seek contribution from the other under the ordinary priority rules.
2. She is confined to her husband's policy: the coverage follows the person rather than the vehicle, and where an insured is covered under more than one policy the highest applicable limit governs, since a lower limit on the occupied vehicle would otherwise defeat protection the household has already paid for.
3. She may claim $50,000 and then draw the difference from her husband's policy as excess protection: the excess route applies wherever the injured person is an insured under a second policy carrying a higher limit for like coverage, whether or not she was occupying her own vehicle at the time, and it is the mechanism by which the Act avoids penalising a household that has bought generous cover on one car and modest cover on another.
4. She is confined to the $50,000 on her own car: IF AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT THE INJURED PERSON IS OCCUPYING A MOTOR VEHICLE, THE LIMIT OF LIABILITY FOR UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGES AVAILABLE TO THE INJURED PERSON IS THE LIMIT SPECIFIED FOR THAT MOTOR VEHICLE, and the excess protection that can follow applies only where the injured person is occupying a motor vehicle OF WHICH THE INJURED PERSON IS NOT AN INSURED. ✓

Why: Minn. Stat. 65B.49, subd. 3a, clause (5) opens with the rule that decides most Minnesota uninsured and underinsured claims: IF AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT THE INJURED PERSON IS OCCUPYING A MOTOR VEHICLE, THE LIMIT OF LIABILITY FOR UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGES AVAILABLE TO THE INJURED PERSON IS THE LIMIT SPECIFIED FOR THAT MOTOR VEHICLE. The coverage follows the OCCUPIED VEHICLE, not the person, and it does so whether that produces a generous limit or a mean one. The second sentence is an exception with a condition the claimant here cannot meet: HOWEVER, IF THE INJURED PERSON IS OCCUPYING A MOTOR VEHICLE OF WHICH THE INJURED PERSON IS NOT AN INSURED, the injured person MAY BE ENTITLED TO EXCESS INSURANCE PROTECTION afforded by a policy in which the injured party is otherwise insured. She was occupying her own car, under a policy on which she is an insured, so the exception never opens. The practical lesson is that an owner who buys a high limit on one car and a low limit on another has bought the low limit for every journey in the second car, and clause (6) forbids adding the two together to make up the difference.

Which valuation method pays the cost to repair or replace property with new property of like kind and quality, without deduction for depreciation?

1. Agreed value
2. Functional replacement cost
3. Actual cash value
4. Replacement cost ✓

Why: Replacement cost pays to repair or replace with new property of like kind and quality with no deduction for depreciation.

The commissioner proposes to send active investigative data on a producer to a regulator in another country and to receive privileged material from a regulator in a third state. An insurer objects that sharing the data will destroy any privilege attaching to it, and that the Department may not put a for-cause termination on an industry clearinghouse.

1. The objections succeed in part: sharing with a regulator in another country is outside the commissioner's authority, which extends to other state and federal agencies and to the NAIC and its affiliates and subsidiaries but not to international bodies; the no-waiver provision protects the sharing that is authorised, in both directions, and the clearinghouse release covers final adjudicated actions, for-cause terminations included.
2. The objections succeed: the no-waiver provision protects material the commissioner RECEIVES but not material the commissioner SHARES onward, so disclosure to a further regulator waives the privilege the insurer would otherwise hold; and the clearinghouse release is confined to final adjudicated actions in the narrow sense of orders entered after a contested hearing, a for-cause termination reported by an insurer not being adjudicated at all until an order is made upon it.
3. The objections fail: no waiver of any applicable privilege or claim of confidentiality occurs as a result of disclosure to the commissioner or of authorised sharing; and nothing in the licensing sections prevents the commissioner releasing information about final, adjudicated actions, including for-cause terminations, to a database or clearinghouse maintained by the NAIC or its affiliates or subsidiaries. ✓
4. The objections fail, but only because the insurer has misread the reach of the subdivision: the sharing power is confined to licensing data and INACTIVE investigative data, active investigative data being shareable only under a written agreement approved in advance by the commissioner of administration; the no-waiver provision and the clearinghouse release then operate exactly as the insurer describes them, and neither the NAIC nor a foreign regulator is excluded.

Why: Minn. Stat. 60K.52 subd. 1 lets the commissioner “share licensing data or any active or inactive investigative data with other state, federal, and international regulatory agencies, with the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, its affiliates or subsidiaries, and with state, federal, and international law enforcement authorities if the recipient agrees to maintain the data in a manner consistent with its data classification”. International agencies are named, which disposes of the second option, and active data is named alongside inactive, which disposes of the fourth. Clause (2) lets the commissioner receive confidential and privileged material and requires it to be maintained as such. The subdivision then states flatly that “no waiver of any applicable privilege or claim of confidentiality in the documents, materials, or information occurs as a result of disclosure to the commissioner under this section or as a result of sharing as authorized in this subdivision” - both directions, not merely receipt, which is the third option's error. It closes by providing that nothing in sections 60K.30 to 60K.56 prohibits the commissioner “from releasing information concerning final, adjudicated actions, including for-cause terminations”, to an NAIC database or clearinghouse; for-cause terminations are named in that phrase rather than excluded from it.

After a covered loss, the insured's duties include all of the following EXCEPT:

1. Admitting liability to any injured third party ✓
2. Protecting the property from further damage
3. Giving prompt notice to the insurer
4. Preparing an inventory of damaged property

Why: Insureds must give notice, mitigate further damage, and document the loss, but they must NOT voluntarily assume obligations or admit liability.

A man is injured by an uninsured driver while driving the car listed on his own policy, which carries uninsured motorist limits of $100,000. He is also an insured under his father's separate policy, which lists two cars at $150,000 each. His damages are $350,000.

1. $400,000, subject to his damages: three vehicles carry uninsured motorist limits and he is an insured under both policies, so all three respond, the prohibition on adding limits together being directed at a single policy that schedules several vehicles rather than at genuinely separate contracts written by different insurers for different premiums; on any other reading a person who happens to be an insured under a relative's policy is worse off than one who bought the same protection himself, and two insurers who each accepted a full premium for uninsured motorist cover would between them owe no more than one of them owed alone, which cannot be what a coverage sold separately by each of them was meant to produce.
2. $250,000: the occupied vehicle's limit responds and the excess provision then draws on the father's policy, since he is an insured under it and its limits are higher, so he receives $100,000 plus the $150,000 carried on one of his father's cars.
3. $150,000: he may select the highest limit for any one vehicle available across the two policies under which he is insured, which is the mechanism the Act gives a claimant whose own coverage is inadequate.
4. $100,000: REGARDLESS OF THE NUMBER OF POLICIES INVOLVED, VEHICLES INVOLVED, PERSONS COVERED, CLAIMS MADE, VEHICLES OR PREMIUMS SHOWN ON THE POLICY, OR PREMIUMS PAID, IN NO EVENT SHALL THE LIMIT OF LIABILITY FOR UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGES FOR TWO OR MORE MOTOR VEHICLES BE ADDED TOGETHER for any one accident; and because he was OCCUPYING A MOTOR VEHICLE of which he IS an insured, the limit available to him is the limit specified for that vehicle and the excess route never opens. ✓

Why: Two clauses of Minn. Stat. 65B.49, subd. 3a have to be applied together, and each on its own would be enough to defeat the larger figures. Clause (6) is indifferent to the number of contracts: REGARDLESS OF THE NUMBER OF POLICIES INVOLVED, VEHICLES INVOLVED, PERSONS COVERED, CLAIMS MADE, VEHICLES OR PREMIUMS SHOWN ON THE POLICY, OR PREMIUMS PAID, IN NO EVENT SHALL THE LIMIT OF LIABILITY FOR UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGES FOR TWO OR MORE MOTOR VEHICLES BE ADDED TOGETHER TO DETERMINE THE LIMIT OF INSURANCE COVERAGE AVAILABLE TO AN INJURED PERSON FOR ANY ONE ACCIDENT. NUMBER OF POLICIES INVOLVED is the phrase that answers the first distractor: two separate contracts with two separate insurers and two separate premiums are still two limits that may not be added. Clause (5) then fixes which single limit answers: IF AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT THE INJURED PERSON IS OCCUPYING A MOTOR VEHICLE, THE LIMIT OF LIABILITY FOR UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGES AVAILABLE TO THE INJURED PERSON IS THE LIMIT SPECIFIED FOR THAT MOTOR VEHICLE. The excess insurance protection later in the clause is confined to a person OCCUPYING A MOTOR VEHICLE OF WHICH THE INJURED PERSON IS NOT AN INSURED, and he was driving his own insured car, so that route is shut. $100,000 answers a $350,000 loss, which is the ordinary consequence of buying a modest limit on the car one actually drives.

Which Part of the Workers Compensation and Employers Liability Policy pays the benefits required by the workers' compensation law of a listed state, with no dollar limit on the amount paid?

1. Part Three — Other States Insurance
2. Part One — Workers Compensation ✓
3. Part Four — Your Duties
4. Part Two — Employers Liability

Why: Part One pays promptly all benefits required by the workers' compensation law of the states listed; because the law sets the benefits, there is no policy limit on Part One.

Under comparative negligence (pure form), a plaintiff found 30% at fault for a $100,000 injury recovers:

1. $100,000
2. $30,000
3. $70,000 ✓
4. $0

Why: Pure comparative negligence reduces recovery by the plaintiff's percentage of fault: $100,000 − 30% = $70,000.

A private motorist's car is a total loss under a policy settling on actual cash value. No comparable car is available in her local market area. The insurer takes a single quotation from a dealer 200 miles away, offers that figure less the deductible, tells her nothing about the quotation, and adds nothing for tax or the unexpired portion of the licence.

1. The insurer has complied: where no comparable automobile is available in the local market area the insurer is released from the local sourcing requirement altogether and may take the best figure it can find anywhere, the alternative being that a claim cannot be settled at all; taxes and licence fees are payable only on the replacement-vehicle method, a cash settlement being a payment of value rather than a purchase; and the deviation clause is a third method standing alongside the replacement vehicle and the cash figure, available whenever the insurer records its reasoning in the file, so that a documented departure from the local market procedure needs no explanation to the insured at all.
2. The insurer has failed only in not disclosing the quotation: a single quotation is sufficient where no comparable automobile exists locally, the plural in the subdivision describing the usual case rather than imposing a minimum, and the distance is immaterial; but the insured must be given the information in the quotation before settlement, and taxes and pro rata licence fees are due on either method.
3. The insurer has failed to offer a permitted method, and it had no discretion in the first place: the subdivision requires the insurer to offer a comparable and available REPLACEMENT AUTOMOBILE, a cash settlement being available only where the insured refuses the vehicle offered, so an insurer that opens with a cash figure has breached the clause before any question about quotations or taxes arises.
4. The insurer has failed to offer a permitted method of settlement: it must offer either a comparable and available replacement automobile with taxes, licence fees AT LEAST PRO RATA for the unexpired term, and transfer fees paid at no cost beyond the deductible, or a cash settlement based on the actual cost of purchase of a comparable automobile including those same taxes and fees; where no comparable automobile is available locally the cost must come from ONE OF TWO OR MORE QUOTATIONS obtained from TWO OR MORE QUALIFIED SOURCES WITHIN THE LOCAL MARKET AREA, and the insured must be provided the information in ALL quotations before settlement. ✓

Why: Minn. Stat. 72A.201 subd. 6(1) applies where an automobile policy settles a total loss on actual cash value or replacement with like kind and quality and "the insured is not an automobile dealer". It makes it an unfair settlement practice to fail to offer ONE OF two methods, so the choice is the insurer's and the fourth option's ranking of them is wrong. Method (a) is a "comparable and available replacement automobile, with all applicable taxes, license fees, AT LEAST PRO RATA for the unexpired term of the replaced automobile's license, and other fees incident to the transfer or evidence of ownership ... paid, at no cost to the insured other than the deductible amount". Method (b) is "a cash settlement based upon the actual cost of purchase of a comparable automobile, INCLUDING ALL APPLICABLE TAXES, LICENSE FEES, at least pro rata for the unexpired term ... and other fees incident to transfer of evidence of ownership, less the deductible" - so taxes and fees attach to the cash method too, which is the second option's error. The cost is determined by (i) "the cost of a comparable automobile, adjusted for mileage, condition, and options, IN THE LOCAL MARKET AREA of the insured, if such an automobile is available in that area"; or (ii) "ONE OF TWO OR MORE QUOTATIONS obtained from TWO OR MORE QUALIFIED SOURCES LOCATED WITHIN THE LOCAL MARKET AREA when a comparable automobile is not available in the local market area. The insured shall be provided the information contained in ALL QUOTATIONS PRIOR TO SETTLEMENT." The local market area constrains the SOURCES even when no comparable car is available in it, which is what the second and third options each miss in turn. Clause (iii) allows a settlement that deviates from the procedure, but only if it "must be documented and justified in detail" and the basis "must be explained to the insured".

A claimant sues in negligence. Her reasonable medical expense benefits paid or payable total $4,300, of which $700 was for diagnostic x-rays and $200 for a purely rehabilitative course. She was not disfigured, has no permanent injury, and was disabled for 40 days. Can she recover damages for pain and suffering?

1. Yes: her medical expense benefits exceed $4,000 on their face, and the deductions the section describes are made from the claimant's tort RECOVERY rather than from the threshold calculation, which is why the section is headed deduction of collateral benefits.
2. Yes: the threshold is disjunctive and she satisfies the disability limb, 40 days of disability being sufficient where the medical threshold is nearly met, the 60-day figure applying only where no medical expense has been incurred at all.
3. No: no person shall recover damages for noneconomic detriment unless the SUM of reasonable medical expense benefits paid, payable or payable but for a deductible, plus the value of free medical or surgical care or nursing services performed by a relative or household member, plus a specified undercharge adjustment, MINUS THE AMOUNT OF MEDICAL EXPENSE BENEFITS FOR DIAGNOSTIC X-RAYS AND FOR REHABILITATION NOT FOR REMEDIAL PURPOSES, EXCEEDS $4,000 - here $4,300 less $900 is $3,400 - OR the injury results in PERMANENT DISFIGUREMENT, PERMANENT INJURY, DEATH, OR DISABILITY FOR 60 DAYS OR MORE. ✓
4. No, but the deduction is different: diagnostic x-rays are subtracted as described, while a course of rehabilitation is subtracted only where it is REMEDIAL, the section excluding remedial treatment because it duplicates the medical expense already counted; on the correct figures the sum is $3,600, which is still below the threshold, so the answer is unchanged but the reasoning is not; the same point matters more in a case near the line, because a claimant with a large course of remedial rehabilitation would cross the threshold on the correct reading and fall short on the incorrect one, and the drafting is deliberately arranged so that treatment which restores function rather than merely training the claimant for other work counts towards the sum.

Why: Minn. Stat. 65B.51, subd. 3 is Minnesota's tort threshold and it is a four-term calculation followed by a four-item alternative. The sum in clause (a) is: (1) reasonable MEDICAL EXPENSE benefits paid, payable, or payable but for any applicable deductible; PLUS (2) the value of free medical or surgical care or ordinary and necessary nursing services performed by a relative of the injured person or a member of the household; PLUS (3) an adjustment where the injured person was charged less than the average reasonable amount charged in this state; MINUS (4) THE AMOUNT OF MEDICAL EXPENSE BENEFITS PAID, PAYABLE OR PAYABLE BUT FOR A DEDUCTIBLE FOR DIAGNOSTIC X-RAYS AND FOR A PROCEDURE OR TREATMENT FOR REHABILITATION AND NOT FOR REMEDIAL PURPOSES OR A COURSE OF REHABILITATIVE OCCUPATIONAL TRAINING. Note the direction of clause (4): it subtracts rehabilitation that is NOT remedial, so both the $700 of x-rays and the $200 rehabilitative course come out. $4,300 less $900 is $3,400, and the threshold requires the sum to EXCEED $4,000. Clause (b) is the alternative route, and any one limb will do: PERMANENT DISFIGUREMENT, PERMANENT INJURY, DEATH, or DISABILITY FOR 60 DAYS OR MORE. Forty days is not enough, and the subdivision defines DISABILITY as the inability to engage in substantially all of the injured person's usual and customary daily activities. Subd. 1 is the separate collateral-source rule: in a negligence action arising from a secured vehicle the court SHALL DEDUCT FROM ANY RECOVERY the value of basic or optional economic loss benefits paid or payable, or which would be payable but for an applicable deductible, and where the claimant is at fault that deduction is made BEFORE the damages are reduced for comparative fault. Subd. 2 preserves a negligence action for economic loss NOT paid or payable because of the daily or weekly dollar limits, the seven-day services exclusion, the subd. 1 benefit limits, or an exclusion under sections 65B.58 to 65B.60.

What is the primary purpose of a Commercial Package Policy (CPP)?

1. To insure only commercial automobiles owned by a single named insured
2. To provide property coverage only, and only for large corporations
3. To combine two or more coverage parts into a single policy for one insured ✓
4. To replace the need for separate liability coverage entirely

Why: A CPP allows two or more coverage parts (e.g., property, general liability, crime) to be combined under a single policy with shared declarations and conditions.

A Minnesota-headquartered manufacturer retains an outside consultant who holds an Associate in Risk Management designation and has eight years' experience purchasing commercial lines. It paid $140,000 in nationwide commercial property and casualty premiums last year, has a net worth of $9,000,000 and revenues of $22,000,000, and employs 620 people. Every risk to be insured is located in Wisconsin.

1. It is NOT an exempt commercial purchaser and its home state is Minnesota: the net worth and revenue tests are the substance of the definition and this insured fails both, the employee count being an alternative available only to a member of an affiliated group; and home state is fixed by principal place of business, which is what makes the term administrable at all, since the location of the risks can change during the policy period while the head office does not. A definition that moved an insured's home state every time it bought cover on an out-of-state building would defeat the allocation of premium tax the term exists to govern, so the residence of the buyer rather than the situs of the risk has to control.
2. It is NOT an exempt commercial purchaser because the consultant is not an employee, but its home state is Minnesota: the qualified risk manager must be inside the business, since the point of the exemption is that the buyer has its own expertise rather than access to someone else's, and an outside adviser is what every insured has in its broker. On the home state question the principal place of business governs, the reference to risks located out of the state being a rule for allocating premium tax among states rather than a rule that changes whose law applies to the placement itself. And the second limb of the home state definition speaks of the insured's RISK rather than of the insured, so it is naturally read as identifying which state's premium tax applies to a particular contract rather than as relocating the insured itself for every other purpose for which the Act uses the term.
3. It IS an exempt commercial purchaser and its home state is Minnesota: it satisfies the premium test and the employee test, and its principal place of business is here, the out-of-state risk rule being confined to an insured that has no principal place of business in any state.
4. It IS an exempt commercial purchaser, and its home state is the state to which the greatest percentage of its taxable premium for that contract is allocated: the consultant is a QUALIFIED RISK MANAGER by the route of AT LEAST SEVEN YEARS OF EXPERIENCE plus a listed designation, the $140,000 satisfies AGGREGATE NATIONWIDE COMMERCIAL PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE PREMIUMS IN EXCESS OF $100,000 IN THE IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING 12 MONTHS, and it MEETS AT LEAST ONE of the five criteria by employing MORE THAN 500 FULL-TIME OR FULL-TIME EQUIVALENT EMPLOYEES; and IF 100 PERCENT OF THE INSURED RISK IS LOCATED OUT OF THE STATE, the term means the state to which the greatest percentage of taxable premium is allocated. ✓

Why: Minn. Stat. 60A.196 is the definitions section of the Minnesota Surplus Lines Insurance Act and two of its definitions decide this. EXEMPT COMMERCIAL PURCHASER has three requirements and the third is a menu. (1) THE PERSON EMPLOYS OR RETAINS A QUALIFIED RISK MANAGER TO NEGOTIATE INSURANCE COVERAGE - EMPLOYS OR RETAINS, so an outside consultant counts, and paragraph (k) says so again: AN EMPLOYEE OF, OR THIRD-PARTY CONSULTANT RETAINED BY, THE COMMERCIAL POLICYHOLDER. That consultant qualifies here by item (iii), AT LEAST SEVEN YEARS OF EXPERIENCE ... AND ONE OF THE DESIGNATIONS SPECIFIED IN ITEM (ii), the ARM being named in item (ii) alongside the CPCU, the CRM and the RIMS Fellow. Note that ten years' experience with no designation at all also qualifies, under item (iv). (2) THE PERSON HAS PAID AGGREGATE NATIONWIDE COMMERCIAL PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE PREMIUMS IN EXCESS OF $100,000 IN THE IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING 12 MONTHS. (3) THE PERSON MEETS AT LEAST ONE OF THE FOLLOWING CRITERIA - net worth over $20,000,000; annual revenues over $50,000,000; MORE THAN 500 FULL-TIME OR FULL-TIME EQUIVALENT EMPLOYEES PER INDIVIDUAL INSURED or membership of an affiliated group employing more than 1,000 in the aggregate; a not-for-profit or public entity with annual budgeted expenditures of at least $30,000,000; or a municipality with a population over 50,000. AT LEAST ONE, so failing the net worth and revenue tests is not fatal where the employee count is met. The three dollar figures in items (i), (ii) and (iv) are indexed - EFFECTIVE JANUARY 1, 2015, AND EVERY FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER ... TO REFLECT THE PERCENTAGE CHANGE ... IN THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX FOR ALL URBAN CONSUMERS. HOME STATE has three limbs and the second governs here: THE STATE IN WHICH AN INSURED MAINTAINS ITS PRINCIPAL PLACE OF BUSINESS, OR IN THE CASE OF AN INDIVIDUAL, THE INDIVIDUAL'S PRINCIPAL RESIDENCE. IF 100 PERCENT OF THE INSURED RISK IS LOCATED OUT OF THE STATE, THE TERM MEANS THE STATE TO WHICH THE GREATEST PERCENTAGE OF THE INSURED'S TAXABLE PREMIUM FOR THAT INSURANCE CONTRACT IS ALLOCATED. A third limb handles an affiliated group with several named insureds on one contract: the home state of the member carrying the largest percentage of premium. Two other definitions in the section are worth carrying away: NONADMITTED INSURER means an insurer not licensed to engage in the business of insurance in Minnesota BUT DOES NOT INCLUDE A RISK RETENTION GROUP, and INSURANCE LAWS means CHAPTERS 60 TO 79 INCLUSIVE.

A Minnesota-licensed producer consents to an order from another state's insurance department, and separately is disciplined by a different Minnesota state agency in respect of his other business. He asks whether either has to be reported here and what he must send.

1. Both must be reported to the commissioner within 30 days of the final disposition of the matter, the duty covering any administrative action taken against the producer in another jurisdiction or by another governmental agency in this state, and the report must include a copy of the order, consent to order or other relevant legal documents. ✓
2. Only the out-of-state consent order must be reported, and within 30 days of the final disposition: the reporting duty is directed at the conduct of other JURISDICTIONS' regulators, action by another Minnesota agency being already known to the state and reaching the licence, if at all, through the denial and revocation section rather than through any reporting obligation.
3. Both must be reported, but within 30 days of the action being commenced rather than of its final disposition, so that the commissioner is not left to learn of a live proceeding from another regulator; the report must include a copy of the order, consent to order or other relevant legal documents once these exist.
4. Both must be reported within 30 days of the final disposition, but a consent to order is not an administrative action for this purpose: the duty reaches an action TAKEN AGAINST the producer, and a matter resolved by agreement without an adverse finding is outside it, so only the Minnesota agency's decision need be reported with the documents.

Why: Minn. Stat. 60K.54 subd. 1 provides that “a producer shall report to the commissioner any administrative action taken against the producer in another jurisdiction or by another governmental agency in this state within 30 days of the final disposition of the matter”, and that “this report must include a copy of the order, consent to order, or other relevant legal documents”. Three points decide the item. Action by another agency in this state is named in the subdivision, so the second option's confinement to other jurisdictions is wrong. The clock runs from final disposition rather than from commencement, which is the third option's substitution - and the contrast with subdivision 2, where criminal reporting runs from the date the prosecution begins, is deliberate. And a consent to order is named among the documents the report must carry, which shows that a matter resolved by consent is within the duty and not outside it, as the fourth option supposes.

An insurer intends to stop writing personal automobile business in Minnesota and to nonrenew the whole line. It asks what it owes the commissioner, what a rule made under this section may take into account, and what it risks if it breaks such a rule.

1. It must notify the commissioner in writing AT LEAST 90 DAYS BEFORE TERMINATION OF ANY POLICY IS EFFECTIVE, stating the effective date of the withdrawal plan, THE NUMBER OF POLICIES AFFECTED, THE REASON FOR THE WITHDRAWAL AND THE AVAILABILITY OF COVERAGE IN THE MARKET; the rules must limit the basis for nonrenewal to the reasons stated for cancellation in section 65B.15, PAYMENTS MADE FOR COLLISION, BODILY INJURY LIABILITY OR PROPERTY DAMAGE LIABILITY COVERAGE, MOVING VIOLATIONS OF A DRIVER, and other factors deemed reasonable by the commissioner; and the rules may impose A MONETARY PENALTY NOT GREATER THAN $500 PER OCCURRENCE. ✓
2. It must notify the commissioner at least 60 days before the first termination, matching the notice owed to each insured; the rules may take into account only the reasons stated for cancellation in section 65B.15, since a nonrenewal cannot rest on a ground that would not support a cancellation; and the penalty the rules may impose is $500 for each policy affected by the violation.
3. It owes the commissioner nothing beyond its ordinary annual filings, a decision to leave a line of business being a matter of business judgement; the rules may take into account any factor the commissioner considers reasonable, without limitation to the cancellation grounds, claim payments or moving violations; and any penalty comes from the general enforcement provisions of chapter 45 rather than from this section.
4. It must notify the commissioner in writing at least 90 days before termination of any policy is effective, but need state only the effective date of the withdrawal plan and the number of policies affected, the reason for the withdrawal and the availability of coverage in the market being commercially sensitive; the rules must limit the basis for nonrenewal to the cancellation grounds, claim payments and moving violations, with no residual category at all, since a residual category would let the commissioner add grounds the legislature did not; and the $500 ceiling is charged for each policy the violation touches.

Why: Three subdivisions of Minn. Stat. 65B.17 answer the three questions. Subd. 2a: AN INSURER WITHDRAWING FROM THE MARKET BY NONRENEWING A LINE OF BUSINESS MUST NOTIFY THE COMMISSIONER IN WRITING AT LEAST 90 DAYS BEFORE TERMINATION OF ANY POLICY IS EFFECTIVE. THE NOTICE MUST CONTAIN THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE WITHDRAWAL PLAN, THE NUMBER OF POLICIES AFFECTED, THE REASON FOR THE WITHDRAWAL, AND THE AVAILABILITY OF COVERAGE IN THE MARKET. Four particulars, and the last two are the ones an insurer would rather not give. The 90 days runs to the termination of ANY policy, so it is measured from the earliest, and it sits on top of the 60 days each insured is owed under subd. 1. Subd. 2: the commissioner MAY adopt rules specifying the grounds for nonrenewal, and THE RULES MUST LIMIT THE BASIS FOR NONRENEWAL TO the following four factors - (a) THE REASONS STATED FOR CANCELLATION IN SECTION 65B.15; (b) PAYMENTS MADE FOR COLLISION, BODILY INJURY LIABILITY, OR PROPERTY DAMAGE LIABILITY COVERAGE; (c) MOVING VIOLATIONS OF A DRIVER; and (d) OTHER FACTORS DEEMED REASONABLE BY THE COMMISSIONER. The rules must also specify how those factors will be considered and MAY REFLECT THE SEVERITY OR RECURRENCE OF ANY MOVING VIOLATION, THE AMOUNT OF ANY PAYMENT MADE, AND THE NUMBER OF VEHICLES INSURED. Subd. 3: THE RULES ADOPTED UNDER THIS SECTION MAY PROVIDE FOR IMPOSITION OF A MONETARY PENALTY NOT GREATER THAN $500 PER OCCURRENCE UPON INSURERS WHO ARE FOUND TO BE IN VIOLATION OF ANY RULE PROVISION - per occurrence, and it is a ceiling.

Two retailers apply for the vendor limited lines licence. The first is a general electronics chain for which insurance is a small sideline. The second derives about 70 percent of its revenue from the sale of portable electronics insurance. Each proposes to name one store manager as the person responsible for compliance and to say nothing about anyone else.

1. That is enough for both: the application must name an employee or officer designated as the person responsible for the vendor's compliance, and the further information about officers, directors and ten percent shareholders is required only where the commissioner calls for it while considering the application, the 50 percent revenue figure going to the fee tier under section 60K.55 rather than to the contents of the application.
2. That is enough for neither: every applicant for a vendor limited lines licence must give the required information for all officers, directors and ten percent shareholders of record, the 50 percent revenue test determining instead whether the vendor must designate a licensed individual producer, rather than a mere employee or officer, as its responsible person.
3. That is enough for the first but not for the second, though the threshold is not the one the second retailer supposes: the additional information is required of a vendor deriving more than 50 percent of its revenue from portable electronics TRANSACTIONS rather than from the insurance, so a chain selling mostly handsets is caught by it and an insurance-led business escapes it however large its insurance book.
4. That is enough for the first but not for the second: where a vendor derives more than 50 percent of its revenue from the sale of portable electronics insurance, the application must give the required information for all officers, directors and shareholders of record having beneficial ownership of ten percent or more of any class of the vendor's securities registered under the federal securities law. ✓

Why: Minn. Stat. 60K.381 subd. 2(a) requires a vendor to hold a limited lines licence issued under the section “to sell or offer coverage under a policy of portable electronics insurance in connection with, and incidental to, a portable electronics transaction with a customer”. Subdivision 2(b)(1) requires the application to “provide the name, residence address, and other information required by the commissioner for an employee or officer of the vendor that is designated by the applicant as the person responsible for the vendor's compliance with the requirements of this chapter”, and then adds: “However, if the vendor derives more than 50 percent of its revenue from the sale of portable electronics insurance, the information noted above must be provided for all officers, directors, and shareholders of record having beneficial ownership of ten percent or more of any class of securities of the vendor registered under the federal securities law.” The trigger is revenue from the sale of the INSURANCE, which is what the fourth option swaps for revenue from the transactions; the additional disclosure is required by the subdivision rather than on request, which is the second option's error; and it applies only above the threshold, which is the third option's. Nothing requires the responsible person to be a licensed individual producer - the subdivision says “an employee or officer”.

When a worker dies from a compensable injury, workers' compensation typically provides:

1. Death/survivor benefits to dependents plus a burial allowance ✓
2. Only reimbursement of medical bills
3. A lump sum equal to lifetime earnings to the estate
4. Nothing, because death ends the claim

Why: Death benefits provide income (survivor) benefits to the deceased worker's dependents and a statutory burial/funeral allowance.

Three drivers injure three different claimants. The first told everyone he was self-insured but never qualified with the commissioner and holds no contract of insurance. The second holds a complying plan whose insurer is disputing this particular claim. The third holds a complying plan at the compulsory minimum limits against damages ten times larger.

1. All three vehicles are uninsured motor vehicles: subd. 16 asks whether a plan of reparation security IS IN EFFECT, and a plan is in effect only so far as it actually answers, so a vehicle whose insurer has declined this claim and a vehicle whose compulsory minimum limits cannot begin to meet the loss are each a vehicle for which no effective security exists; reading the definition any other way leaves the claimant of a disputed claim with nothing to look to while the coverage suit runs its course, and treats a minimum-limits policy against damages ten times its size as security in name only.
2. The first and second are uninsured and the third is underinsured: a plan whose insurer refuses to answer a particular claim is not IN EFFECT with respect to that claim, which is the sense the definition uses when it speaks of effect rather than of existence, and the third vehicle fits subd. 17 exactly, a bodily injury liability policy applying at the time of the accident with a limit below the amount needed to compensate the insured; on any narrower reading the second claimant must wait out a coverage dispute between strangers before learning whether any coverage answers her.
3. The first is an uninsured motor vehicle, the second is neither, and the third is an underinsured motor vehicle: UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE means a motor vehicle or motorcycle FOR WHICH A PLAN OF REPARATION SECURITY MEETING THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTIONS 65B.41 TO 65B.71 IS NOT IN EFFECT, and UNDERINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE means one TO WHICH A BODILY INJURY LIABILITY POLICY APPLIES AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT BUT ITS LIMIT IS LESS THAN THE AMOUNT NEEDED TO COMPENSATE THE INSURED FOR ACTUAL DAMAGES. ✓
4. Only the third is either of them: the first driver's declared self-insurance is a plan of reparation security in the sense the definition uses, since the Act permits security to be provided by qualifying as a self-insurer and subd. 16 looks to the kind of security rather than to whether the paperwork with the commissioner was completed, so his vehicle is insured and the second driver's plainly is; a claimant injured by a self-insurer who never filed is left to pursue him directly, which is the position she would occupy against any other solvent defendant.

Why: Minn. Stat. 65B.43, subd. 16 turns on a fact about the vehicle, not about the claim: an UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE is a MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTORCYCLE FOR WHICH A PLAN OF REPARATION SECURITY MEETING THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTIONS 65B.41 TO 65B.71 IS NOT IN EFFECT. Two phrases carry the weight. MEETING THE REQUIREMENTS means the test is not whether the owner bought something but whether what he has complies, so a driver who describes himself as self-insured without having qualified has no plan of reparation security at all and his vehicle is uninsured. IS NOT IN EFFECT is a question about the existence of the plan on the day, not about how the insurer is behaving: the second driver's plan is in effect, so his vehicle is not an uninsured motor vehicle, and a coverage dispute between him and his insurer is a matter for the two of them rather than a route into the claimant's uninsured motorist coverage. Nor is his vehicle underinsured, because subd. 17 requires the limit to be LESS THAN THE AMOUNT NEEDED TO COMPENSATE THE INSURED FOR ACTUAL DAMAGES and nothing suggests it is. The third driver's vehicle satisfies subd. 17 exactly: a bodily injury liability policy applied at the time of the accident, and its limit is far below the damages. Carrying the compulsory minimum is no answer to that definition - it is the commonest way of satisfying it.

An insurer submits a policy form, an application and four endorsements together, and in the same package the rates and rules for that business. Separately, three companies in its group submit identical filings. It asks what the specific fee examples in the rules produce.

1. $10 for the first package, the form, application, endorsements, rates and rules all pertaining to the same line and being submitted together, and $10 for the group filings, identical simultaneous filings within a group being charged once.
2. $20 for the first package and $10 for the group filings: the three companies file identically and simultaneously, so a single fee covers the group, the separate-fee rule applying only where the filings differ from one another.
3. $20 for the first package - $10 for the form, application and endorsements, and a further $10 because rates and rules are submitted with it - and $30 for the group filings, being $10 for each of the three companies. ✓
4. $30 for the first package - $10 each for the form, the application and the endorsements, with the rates and rules carried free as supporting data - and $30 for the group filings.

Why: Minn. R. 2605.0500 works the arithmetic through in four examples. A: “A filing consisting of a policy form, an application, and four endorsements are subject to a filing fee of $10” - one fee for the package, not one per document, which is the fourth option's error. B: “Rates and rules submitted together with the filing described in item A are subject to an additional $10 filing fee, for a total of $20” - so the rates and rules add a second fee rather than riding free, which is what the second option and the fourth option each assume. C: “A group of three companies submitting identical filings are subject to a $10 filing fee for each company for a total of $30”, which matches part 2605.0200 item C and disposes of the second and third options. D adds that a filing for nonadoption or only changing the effective date of a prior rate service organisation filing attracts $10, and that including three endorsements replacing those filed on the organisation's behalf leaves the fee unchanged.

An insurer asks which of these must satisfy the readability chapter: a personal auto policy issued this year; the master contract for a group policy covering 40 employees; a homeowner's policy written in Somali at the customer's request; and a health maintenance contract under chapter 62D.

1. The auto policy and the health maintenance contract must; the group master contract and the Somali policy need not: the chapter APPLIES TO ALL POLICIES OR CONTRACTS OF DIRECT INSURANCE, INCLUDING NONPROFIT HEALTH SERVICE PLAN CORPORATIONS UNDER CHAPTER 62C, HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS UNDER CHAPTER 62D, AND FRATERNAL BENEFIT SOCIETIES UNDER CHAPTER 64B; it SHALL NOT APPLY TO INSURANCE AS DESCRIBED IN THE MASTER CONTRACT FOR ANY POLICY OF GROUP INSURANCE WHEN THE GROUP CONSISTS OF TEN OR MORE PERSONS; and it SHALL NOT APPLY TO A NEW POLICY OR CONTRACT WRITTEN IN LANGUAGE OTHER THAN ENGLISH. ✓
2. All four must: the chapter's purpose is that insurance contracts be readable and understandable to a person of average intelligence, experience and education, and a contract written in a language the customer reads is more understandable rather than less, while a group master contract is the document that defines what every certificate holder has bought. A certificate holder who wants to know what he has bought must read the master contract or nothing, so exempting it would exempt the only document that answers the question; and a chapter drafted around the reader cannot coherently drop its protection at the point where the reader most needs it, which is why the exclusions are better read as describing documents already regulated elsewhere.
3. Only the auto policy must: the chapter is a property and casualty measure and the health contracts are regulated for readability under their own chapters, group business is written between commercial parties, and a policy in another language is outside any English readability test by definition.
4. The auto policy, the health maintenance contract and the Somali policy must; only the group master contract need not: the chapter is drafted around the reader rather than around the language, so a policy in Somali must be readable to a person of average intelligence reading Somali, and the Flesch procedure is applied to whatever language the contract is written in; the group exclusion is as described, and the ten-person threshold marks the point at which the buyer is taken to be a sophisticated one. The Flesch procedure counts syllables and sentences, both of which exist in any language, so nothing in the computation is peculiar to English.

Why: Minn. Stat. 72C.03 states the scope in one paragraph with four exclusions. The rule: EXCEPT AS OTHERWISE SPECIFICALLY PROVIDED, SECTIONS 72C.01 TO 72C.13 SHALL APPLY TO ALL POLICIES OR CONTRACTS OF DIRECT INSURANCE, ISSUED BY PERSONS AUTHORIZED AT ANY TIME TO TRANSACT INSURANCE IN THIS STATE AND INCLUDING NONPROFIT HEALTH SERVICE PLAN CORPORATIONS UNDER CHAPTER 62C, HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS UNDER CHAPTER 62D, AND FRATERNAL BENEFIT SOCIETIES UNDER CHAPTER 64B. DIRECT insurance, so reinsurance is out; and the three named inclusions are there because each might otherwise have argued it was not writing insurance at all. The exclusions: insurance AS DESCRIBED IN THE MASTER CONTRACT FOR ANY POLICY OF GROUP INSURANCE WHEN THE GROUP CONSISTS OF TEN OR MORE PERSONS; policies issued BEFORE JULY 1, 1980 UNDER WHICH THERE IS NO UNILATERAL RIGHT OF THE INSURER TO CANCEL, NONRENEW, AMEND OR CHANGE IN ANY WAY, unless amended by mutual agreement; a policy WHICH IS A SECURITY SUBJECT TO FEDERAL JURISDICTION; and A NEW POLICY OR CONTRACT WRITTEN IN LANGUAGE OTHER THAN ENGLISH. The last is the one the fourth distractor gets wrong, and the reason is practical: the compliance test in section 72C.09 is a Flesch score computed from syllables per word and words per sentence, which is calibrated for English and means nothing applied to another language. Section 72C.02 states the purpose - that policies BE READABLE AND UNDERSTANDABLE TO A PERSON OF AVERAGE INTELLIGENCE, EXPERIENCE, AND EDUCATION, written in SIMPLE AND COMMONLY USED LANGUAGE, LOGICALLY AND CLEARLY ARRANGED, PRINTED IN A LEGIBLE FORMAT - and adds the limit that makes the chapter safe to apply: IT IS NOT THE INTENT ... TO MANDATE, REQUIRE OR ALLOW ALTERATION OF THE LEGAL EFFECT OF ANY PROVISION OF ANY INSURANCE POLICY OR CONTRACT. Section 72C.04 defines LEGIBLE TYPE as A TYPE FACE AT LEAST AS LARGE AS TEN-POINT MODERN TYPE, ONE POINT LEADED.

An injured person begins a course of rehabilitative occupational training. The bill passes $1,000 on 1 April; the obligor knows nothing of it and is told on 1 August. Costs incurred since 1 April total $9,000, of which $2,500 was incurred in July. There is no excusable neglect.

1. The obligor is responsible for the whole $9,000: the notice requirement is directory and its only consequence is that the obligor may dispute the reasonableness of expenses it was given no chance to review, the section fixing no monetary limit.
2. The obligor is responsible for $1,000: late notice caps the obligor's responsibility at the threshold figure, which is the point of expressing the threshold in dollars, and the reference to expense within 60 days of the notice describes a claimant who gave notice on time.
3. The obligor is responsible for $3,500: the greater-of rule operates as described, but the two limbs are cumulative rather than alternative where the claimant has incurred expense both before and after the notice, so the $1,000 floor is added to the expense within the 60-day window; reading them as alternatives would leave a claimant who incurred a large early expense worse off than one who incurred nothing at all until the notice was given, which cannot have been the intention behind a sanction that is aimed at the claimant's silence.
4. The obligor is responsible for $2,500: an injured person who has undertaken rehabilitative occupational training, other than medical rehabilitation, SHALL GIVE NOTICE within 60 DAYS AFTER A REHABILITATION EXPENSE EXCEEDING $1,000 HAS BEEN INCURRED, unless the obligor knows or has reason to know; and if timely notice is not given, THE OBLIGOR IS RESPONSIBLE ONLY FOR $1,000, OR THE EXPENSE INCURRED AFTER THE NOTICE IS GIVEN AND WITHIN THE 60 DAYS BEFORE THE NOTICE, WHICHEVER IS GREATER, unless the failure results from EXCUSABLE NEGLECT. ✓

Why: Minn. Stat. 65B.45, subd. 2 sets a notice duty and a sanction, and the sanction is a greater-of, not a flat cap. The injured person must give notice WITHIN 60 DAYS after a rehabilitation expense EXCEEDING $1,000 has been incurred for a procedure, treatment or course of rehabilitative occupational training - other than a MEDICAL rehabilitation procedure or treatment, which is outside the duty - unless the reparation obligor knows or has reason to know of the undertaking. Notice was due by about 31 May and came on 1 August. The consequence: the obligor is responsible ONLY FOR $1,000, OR THE EXPENSE INCURRED AFTER THE NOTICE IS GIVEN AND WITHIN THE 60 DAYS BEFORE THE NOTICE, WHICHEVER IS GREATER, unless the failure to give timely notice is the result of EXCUSABLE NEGLECT. The whole of July falls inside the 60 days before 1 August, so that limb yields $2,500, which beats the $1,000 floor. Subd. 1 states the underlying responsibility and its three conditions: the procedure, treatment or training must be REASONABLE AND APPROPRIATE for the particular case, its cost REASONABLE IN RELATION TO ITS PROBABLE REHABILITATIVE EFFECTS, and it must be LIKELY TO CONTRIBUTE SUBSTANTIALLY to medical or occupational rehabilitation. Subd. 3 lets either side go to court for a determination of responsibility, and provides that a determination against the obligor's responsibility for one proposal is NOT RES JUDICATA as to any other proposal or the person's right to other benefits. Subd. 4 lets the obligor seek a reduction or termination of future benefits where the injured person UNREASONABLY REFUSES treatment or training, the court weighing the risks, the probable benefit, the place offered, how far the procedure is recognised as standard and customary, and whether sanctions would abridge the right to free exercise of religion.

Flood damage to a home is covered under a standard Homeowners policy:

1. Only under the HO-8 modified form, which reaches flood because losses there settle at functional repair cost
2. Always, since water damage of any origin falls within the open-peril wording of the dwelling coverage
3. Only under Coverage F, which responds to flood damage once a federal disaster is declared for the county
4. Never; flood is excluded and covered through the NFIP or a separate flood policy ✓

Why: Flood is a standard exclusion in Homeowners policies; it must be insured separately, typically through the National Flood Insurance Program.

An insured says he never received the nonrenewal notice and that the cover therefore continues. The insurer produces its mailing record showing the notice, with its reasons, sent to the address shown in the policy. The insured had moved and had told his agent verbally.

1. The insurer must show actual receipt: a notice provision that can be satisfied without the insured ever learning of the decision would defeat the purpose of requiring notice at all, and the burden of proving that a communication reached its intended recipient falls on the party that chose to communicate by post rather than by a method that produces acknowledgement.
2. The insurer must show that it used the most recent address it knew of: proof of mailing is sufficient only where the insurer has no reason to believe the address is stale, and an insurer whose agent has been told of a move has that reason, the agent's knowledge being the insurer's knowledge for this purpose; the address shown in the policy is the default rather than a safe harbour, and an insurer that has been told otherwise cannot rely on a record it knows to be out of date.
3. The mailing record is enough only for the cancellation cases: the section names cancellation and reduction in the limits of liability, and a nonrenewal is governed by its own notice provision, which requires the notice to be mailed or delivered and therefore contemplates proof that one or the other actually happened at the insured's end.
4. The mailing record is enough: PROOF OF MAILING OF NOTICE of cancellation, reduction in the limits of liability of coverage, or nonrenewal of a policy AND, IF REQUIRED HEREIN, THE REASON OR REASONS THEREFOR TO THE NAMED INSURED AT THE ADDRESS SHOWN IN THE POLICY, SHALL BE SUFFICIENT PROOF THAT NOTICE REQUIRED HEREIN HAS BEEN GIVEN. ✓

Why: Minn. Stat. 65B.18 is one sentence and it settles a question that would otherwise be fought over in every disputed termination: PROOF OF MAILING OF NOTICE OF CANCELLATION, REDUCTION IN THE LIMITS OF LIABILITY OF COVERAGE, OR NONRENEWAL OF A POLICY AND, IF REQUIRED HEREIN, THE REASON OR REASONS THEREFOR TO THE NAMED INSURED AT THE ADDRESS SHOWN IN THE POLICY, SHALL BE SUFFICIENT PROOF THAT NOTICE REQUIRED HEREIN HAS BEEN GIVEN. Three things to take from it. It covers all three actions - cancellation, reduction in limits, and nonrenewal - so there is no separate regime for nonrenewals. What must be proved mailed is the notice AND, where the Act requires them, the REASONS, so an insurer that can prove it posted a bare notice has not discharged the section where a reason was owed. And the address is THE ADDRESS SHOWN IN THE POLICY, which is the same address sections 65B.17 and 65A.29 direct the notice to; an insured who moves protects himself by having the policy changed, not by telling someone. The section proves that notice was GIVEN. It does not deem the notice received, and it does not cure a notice that was short, unreasoned or sent on a ground the Act does not allow.

A risk is bound with three nonadmitted insurers on a Monday. The broker's assistant, who is a licensed agent but not a surplus lines broker, issues the client a certificate nine working days later naming only the lead insurer and saying nothing about how the three divide the risk.

1. Only the delay is a breach: the seven-working-day period is the one hard rule in the section, and it runs from the date the risk was bound, so a certificate handed over on the ninth working day is out of time; the contents of the document are left to the broker because the division of a subscription among the insurers is a matter between them rather than something the insured can act on, and issuance is not restricted either, a certificate being the broker's own paper and signable by any licensed agent in the broker's office who has the file in front of him.
2. Only the identity of the issuer is a breach: evidence of a placement may be issued by the surplus lines broker personally and by nobody else, but the seven working days run from the insurer's delivery of the policy to the broker rather than from binding, so the assistant was well inside the period; and naming the lead insurer satisfies the section, because the insurers and their shares have to be given only to the extent known to the broker, which on a fresh subscription placement is commonly nothing at all.
3. All three are breaches: ONLY A SURPLUS LINES BROKER SHALL ISSUE EVIDENCE OF PLACEMENT OF INSURANCE WITH A NONADMITTED INSURER; the broker shall WITHIN SEVEN WORKING DAYS AFTER THE DATE ON WHICH THE RISK WAS BOUND or the insured was advised that coverage has been or will be obtained deliver a policy, written binder, certificate or other written evidence; and the written communication SHALL IDENTIFY ALL KNOWN NONADMITTED INSURERS DIRECTLY ASSUMING ANY RISK OF LOSS and, where there is more than one, SHALL SPECIFY, TO THE EXTENT KNOWN BY THE BROKER, WHETHER THE OBLIGATION IS JOINT OR SEVERAL, AND IF THE OBLIGATION IS SEVERAL, THE PROPORTION ASSUMED BY EACH INSURER. ✓
4. The delay and the missing insurers are breaches but the assistant was entitled to issue the document: a licensed agent may act for the broker in delivering evidence of a placement the broker has made, the restriction in the section being directed at persons outside the transaction altogether, such as an insurer's own representative or a managing general agent who has not been through the surplus lines licensing route at all; and naming the lead alone does not discharge the duty to identify every known insurer and state the proportions. On that reading ONLY marks out who may take part in a nonadmitted placement rather than the individual who signs.

Why: Minn. Stat. 60A.202 is three short subdivisions and each supplies one of the three breaches. Subd. 1: ONLY A SURPLUS LINES BROKER SHALL ISSUE EVIDENCE OF PLACEMENT OF INSURANCE WITH A NONADMITTED INSURER. ONLY, with no delegation permitted - which sits beside section 60A.198, subd. 1, where an ordinary licensed agent MAY assist in the placement itself. The agent may help place the risk and may not issue the paper that proves it. Subd. 2: A BROKER SHALL, WITHIN SEVEN WORKING DAYS AFTER THE DATE ON WHICH THE RISK WAS BOUND OR THE INSURED OR APPLICANT WAS ADVISED THAT COVERAGE HAS BEEN OR WILL BE OBTAINED, DELIVER TO THE INSURED OR THE INSURED'S REPRESENTATIVE A POLICY, A WRITTEN BINDER, A CERTIFICATE OR OTHER WRITTEN EVIDENCE OF INSURANCE PLACED WITH A NONADMITTED INSURER. WORKING days, and the clock starts at binding or at the advice that coverage has been or WILL BE obtained - whichever comes first in fact - not at receipt of the policy from the insurer, which is what the second distractor assumes. Nine working days is out. Subd. 3: THE WRITTEN COMMUNICATION SHOWING THAT INSURANCE HAS BEEN OBTAINED SHALL IDENTIFY ALL KNOWN NONADMITTED INSURERS DIRECTLY ASSUMING ANY RISK OF LOSS. IF THERE IS MORE THAN ONE NONADMITTED INSURER, ANY DOCUMENT ISSUED OR CERTIFIED BY THE BROKER PURSUANT TO SUBDIVISION 2 SHALL SPECIFY, TO THE EXTENT KNOWN BY THE BROKER, WHETHER THE OBLIGATION IS JOINT OR SEVERAL, AND IF THE OBLIGATION IS SEVERAL, THE PROPORTION OF THE OBLIGATION ASSUMED BY EACH INSURER. This is the practical heart of the section: on a subscription placement the insured is not buying one promise but several, and unless the document says otherwise each insurer answers only for its own share. TO THE EXTENT KNOWN BY THE BROKER qualifies the proportions, not the duty to name the insurers, which is unqualified as to all KNOWN insurers.

After a fire the insured gives immediate written notice and files a sworn statement on the 50th day. The insurer asks him to submit to an examination under oath, tells him nothing about counsel, and 40 days after receiving the proof of loss says it will rebuild instead of paying. He sues 26 months after the fire.

1. Everything the insured did was in time and everything the insurer did was permissible: the 60-day and 30-day periods are directory, the caution before an examination under oath belongs to criminal investigation rather than to a policy condition, and an action on a fire policy is governed by the ordinary six-year contract limitation.
2. The proof of loss was late and the suit was in time: the sworn statement is due within 30 days of the loss and the suit limitation is the six-year contract period, so the insured lost the claim at the proof-of-loss stage and the later questions do not arise; a company that elects to repair, rebuild or replace may do so at any time before it pays, the 30 days being the period within which it must finish the work.
3. The proof of loss was in time and the suit was in time, but the insurer's conduct was correct throughout: the option to repair, rebuild or replace may be exercised at any time before the amount becomes payable, which is 60 days after the proof of loss, so an election on the 40th day is inside it; and the caution about counsel protects a person being investigated for arson rather than an ordinary claimant, so an insurer that suspects nothing owes no warning and the examination stands. The two-year period is a policy condition rather than a statute of limitation, and can be waived.
4. The proof of loss was in time, the examination request was defective, the election to rebuild was out of time, and the suit is out of time: the statement must be rendered WITHIN 60 DAYS; the insured must be INFORMED OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND THAT ANY ANSWERS MAY BE USED AGAINST THE INSURED IN LATER CIVIL OR CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS before submitting to examination; the company's option TO REPAIR, REBUILD OR REPLACE requires NOTICE OF ITS INTENTION WITHIN 30 DAYS AFTER THE RECEIPT OF THE PROOF OF LOSS; and NO SUIT SHALL BE SUSTAINABLE UNLESS COMMENCED WITHIN TWO YEARS AFTER INCEPTION OF THE LOSS. ✓

Why: Four clauses of Minn. Stat. 65A.01, subd. 3, in the order the claim runs. Notice and proof: IN CASE OF ANY LOSS UNDER THIS POLICY THE INSURED SHALL GIVE IMMEDIATE WRITTEN NOTICE TO THIS COMPANY OF ANY LOSS, PROTECT THE PROPERTY FROM FURTHER DAMAGE, AND A STATEMENT IN WRITING, SIGNED AND SWORN TO BY THE INSURED, SHALL WITHIN 60 DAYS BE RENDERED TO THE COMPANY, setting out the value of the property, the insured's interest, all other insurance in detail, the purposes for which and the persons by whom the building was used, and how the fire originated so far as known - EXCEPT IN CASE OF TOTAL LOSS ON BUILDINGS THE VALUE NEED NOT BE STATED. Examination: the insured shall exhibit what remains, and AFTER BEING INFORMED OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND THAT ANY ANSWERS MAY BE USED AGAINST THE INSURED IN LATER CIVIL OR CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS, SHALL, WITHIN A REASONABLE PERIOD AFTER DEMAND, SUBMIT TO EXAMINATIONS UNDER OATH by any person named by the company and subscribe the oath, and produce all records and documents reasonably related to the loss. That warning is in the policy the legislature wrote; it is not an option. The company's election: IT SHALL BE OPTIONAL WITH THIS COMPANY TO TAKE ALL OF THE PROPERTY AT THE AGREED OR APPRAISED VALUE, AND ALSO TO REPAIR, REBUILD OR REPLACE THE PROPERTY DESTROYED OR DAMAGED WITH OTHER OF LIKE KIND AND QUALITY WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME, ON GIVING NOTICE OF ITS INTENTION SO TO DO WITHIN 30 DAYS AFTER THE RECEIPT OF THE PROOF OF LOSS. Payment: the amount is PAYABLE 60 DAYS AFTER PROOF OF LOSS is received and the loss is ascertained by agreement in writing or by the filing of an award. And the limitation: NO SUIT OR ACTION ON THIS POLICY FOR THE RECOVERY OF ANY CLAIM SHALL BE SUSTAINABLE IN ANY COURT OF LAW OR EQUITY UNLESS ALL THE REQUIREMENTS OF THIS POLICY HAVE BEEN COMPLIED WITH, AND UNLESS COMMENCED WITHIN TWO YEARS AFTER INCEPTION OF THE LOSS - two years, and it runs from the inception of the loss rather than from denial.

Which of the following is a possible result of the underwriting process?

1. Acceptance with modified terms or higher premium
2. Rejection of the risk
3. All of the above ✓
4. Acceptance of the risk as applied for

Why: Underwriting can result in accepting the risk as is, accepting with modifications/conditions, or rejecting the application.

A producer was convicted years ago of a felony involving embezzlement (a crime of dishonesty). To continue working in insurance, federal law (18 U.S.C. 1033) requires that the producer:

1. Give written notice to the agency's compliance officer
2. Wait until a court seals or expunges the conviction record, at which point the federal bar lifts automatically
3. Obtain written consent from the state insurance regulatory official ✓
4. Renew the state producer license on its normal schedule

Why: Under 18 U.S.C. 1033, a person convicted of a felony involving dishonesty cannot work in insurance affecting interstate commerce without written consent from the appropriate insurance regulator.

A rate service organisation that makes rate filings on behalf of member insurers, and a licensed insurer that makes its own policy form filings, each ask whether the filing fee rules apply to them, and where the authority for those rules comes from.

1. They apply to both: the parts apply to all licensed insurers and to rate service, data service or other organisations that make insurance policy form or rate filings required by statute, and they are adopted under the authority granted by the general rulemaking section and by the section on fees payable to the commissioner. ✓
2. They apply to the insurer only: the fee rules reach the person on whom the statute lays the filing obligation, and a rate service organisation makes its filings on behalf of its member insurers rather than in its own right, so the fee on each such filing is payable by the member whose rates are filed and the organisation itself falls outside parts 2605.0100 to 2605.0500 in its own capacity.
3. They apply to both, but only to rate filings: the parts are adopted under the fees section of chapter 60A, which is concerned with rates and the review of them, so policy form filings are governed instead by the provisions on form approval and carry their own separate fee schedule, and a form filed by an insurer or by a rate service organisation attracts nothing under these parts.
4. They apply to both, and to voluntary filings as well as to those required by statute: the scope provision names statutory filings as the paradigm case rather than as a limit, so an insurer that chooses to file a form it is under no obligation to file pays the same fee as one filing under compulsion, the Department's work of reviewing the document being identical either way.

Why: Minn. R. 2605.0100 is one paragraph: “Parts 2605.0100 to 2605.0500 apply to all licensed insurers and rate service, data service, or other organizations that make insurance policy form or rate filings required by statute. They are adopted pursuant to authority granted under Minnesota Statutes, sections 45.023 and 60A.14, subdivision 1, paragraph (c).” Rate service and data service organisations are named alongside insurers, which is what the second option argues out; policy FORM filings are named alongside rate filings, which is the third option's error; and the scope is confined to filings “required by statute”, so the fourth option's extension to voluntary filings is an addition to the text. Section 45.023 is off corpus and is named here rather than described; section 60A.14 is the fees section of chapter 60A.

Two unrelated roommates jointly own a car and both want PAP coverage as named insureds. The appropriate endorsement is:

1. Named Non-Owner
2. Joint Ownership Coverage ✓
3. Miscellaneous Type Vehicle
4. Extended Non-Owned for a Named Individual

Why: The Joint Ownership Coverage endorsement adapts the PAP for two or more individuals who are not married but jointly own the covered auto.

An insurer nonrenews a homeowner's policy after two paid claims and one telephone call in which the insured asked her agent whether a cracked window would be worth claiming. It has no written plan about claim frequency and has never warned the insured that further losses might cost her the policy.

1. The nonrenewal is good: two paid claims in a policy period is a loss record any insurer may act on, and the requirement of a plan is an internal governance matter that does not affect the validity of a decision taken without one.
2. The nonrenewal is bad only because of the inquiry: counting a call to the agent as a claim is prohibited, but the absence of a plan and of a prior warning are matters between the insurer and the commissioner rather than conditions of a valid nonrenewal, since neither requirement is expressed as making the nonrenewal ineffective and the insured is protected instead by the right to appeal.
3. The nonrenewal is bad on three grounds: EVERY INSURER SHALL ESTABLISH A PLAN THAT SETS OUT THE MINIMUM NUMBER AND AMOUNT OF CLAIMS DURING AN EXPERIENCE PERIOD THAT MAY RESULT IN A NONRENEWAL; THE INSURER MAY NOT CONSIDER AS A CLAIM THE INSURED'S INQUIRY ABOUT A HYPOTHETICAL CLAIM, OR THE INSURED'S INQUIRY TO THE INSURED'S AGENT REGARDING A POTENTIAL CLAIM; and NO HOMEOWNER'S INSURANCE POLICY MAY BE NONRENEWED BASED ON THE INSURED'S LOSS EXPERIENCE UNLESS THE INSURER HAS SENT A WRITTEN NOTICE THAT ANY FUTURE LOSSES MAY RESULT IN NONRENEWAL DUE TO LOSS EXPERIENCE. ✓
4. The nonrenewal is bad because loss experience is not an available ground at all: the commissioner's rules must limit nonrenewal to the cancellation grounds and to matters amounting to unfair practices, so a policy may never be ended for claiming, and the provisions about plans and warnings are directed at the insurer's rating rather than at termination; an insurer unhappy with a loss record must reflect it in the premium. A rule that allowed termination for claiming would put an insured to the choice between using the cover she has paid for and keeping it, which is a choice the loss-experience provisions are drafted to prevent her from having to make at all.

Why: Minn. Stat. 65A.29, subd. 11 imposes three separate requirements on a loss-experience nonrenewal and this insurer has met none of them. First: EVERY INSURER SHALL ESTABLISH A PLAN THAT SETS OUT THE MINIMUM NUMBER AND AMOUNT OF CLAIMS DURING AN EXPERIENCE PERIOD THAT MAY RESULT IN A NONRENEWAL. The plan must fix both a NUMBER and an AMOUNT, and it must do so in advance, so an insurer cannot decide after the event that two claims were too many. Second: FOR PURPOSES OF THE PLAN, THE INSURER MAY NOT CONSIDER AS A CLAIM THE INSURED'S INQUIRY ABOUT A HYPOTHETICAL CLAIM, OR THE INSURED'S INQUIRY TO THE INSURED'S AGENT REGARDING A POTENTIAL CLAIM. Both limbs are needed here: the call was to the AGENT and it was about a POTENTIAL claim. Third, and this is the requirement most often missed: NO HOMEOWNER'S INSURANCE POLICY MAY BE NONRENEWED BASED ON THE INSURED'S LOSS EXPERIENCE UNLESS THE INSURER HAS SENT A WRITTEN NOTICE THAT ANY FUTURE LOSSES MAY RESULT IN NONRENEWAL DUE TO LOSS EXPERIENCE. It is a warning shot the insured is entitled to before the policy is at risk. The subdivision closes by requiring that ANY NONRENEWAL OF A HOMEOWNER'S INSURANCE POLICY MUST, AT A MINIMUM, COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF SUBDIVISION 8 AND THE RULES ADOPTED BY THE COMMISSIONER, so the loss-experience rules sit on top of the general ones rather than replacing them. The inquiry protection is the same policy that produces the surcharge prohibition in section 65A.285.

Under the BPP, money stolen from a register is not covered. The correct coverage to address this exposure is:

1. The Special Causes of Loss form
2. A commercial crime policy ✓
3. Ordinance or Law
4. Builders Risk

Why: Money and securities are excluded under property forms; theft of money is properly insured under a commercial crime policy.

An insurer settling a kitchen fire applies a depreciation deduction to the granite worktop, which is unaffected by age or use. It also applies a betterment deduction to a section of flooring, on the footing that new boards are worth more than old ones, although the repair has not raised the resale value of the house above what it was before the fire.

1. Both deductions are unfair settlement practices: reducing or attempting to reduce FOR DEPRECIATION any settlement or offer of settlement for items NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY AGE, USE, OR OBSOLESCENCE is prohibited; and reducing or attempting to reduce FOR BETTERMENT is prohibited UNLESS THE RESALE VALUE OF THE ITEM HAS INCREASED OVER THE PRELOSS VALUE by the repair of the damage. ✓
2. Neither deduction is an unfair settlement practice: depreciation and betterment are ordinary incidents of indemnity, and the subdivision prohibits only a deduction taken without telling the insured what it is for and how it was calculated, so an insurer that has set out both figures and their basis in its settlement letter has complied whatever the condition of the worktop and whatever the repair did to the resale value of the house.
3. The depreciation deduction is an unfair settlement practice but the betterment deduction is not: betterment may be taken whenever the repair leaves the insured better off than before the loss in any respect, and new boards for old is such a case, the reference to resale value describing the usual way that improvement is measured rather than a condition that must be met before any deduction may be taken at all.
4. Both deductions are unfair settlement practices, and the depreciation rule is wider still: no depreciation may be applied to any part of a building claim, the clause reaching personal property alone, so a settlement on a structure is paid in full whether or not the component was worn out on the day of the loss.

Why: Minn. Stat. 72A.201 subd. 5(9): "reducing or attempting to reduce FOR DEPRECIATION any settlement or any offer of settlement FOR ITEMS NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY AGE, USE, OR OBSOLESCENCE." The test is the condition of the item, not the kind of property it belongs to; the clause neither permits nor forbids depreciation as such, which is the second option's reading, and it draws no line between buildings and contents, which is the fourth option's. Subd. 5(10): "reducing or attempting to reduce FOR BETTERMENT any settlement or any offer of settlement UNLESS THE RESALE VALUE OF THE ITEM HAS INCREASED OVER THE PRELOSS VALUE BY THE REPAIR of the damage." Resale value against preloss value is the whole of the test, not an illustration of it, so a repair that leaves the property no more valuable than it was cannot carry a betterment deduction however new the materials - which is the third option's error. Both clauses sit in the fair settlement standards and bind an insurer, an adjuster, a self-insured and a self-insurance administrator alike.

In the Dwelling Policy, which coverage applies to a detached garage or storage shed?

1. Coverage B — Other Structures ✓
2. Coverage C — Personal Property
3. Coverage A — Dwelling
4. Coverage D — Fair Rental Value

Why: Coverage B — Other Structures covers structures separated from the dwelling, such as detached garages, sheds, and fences.

The primary purpose of a coinsurance clause in property insurance is to:

1. Increase the deductible automatically whenever property values rise during the term
2. Lower every insured's premium by a fixed percentage regardless of the amount carried
3. Extend liability protection to others who share ownership of the insured property
4. Encourage insureds to carry coverage close to the full value of the property ✓

Why: Coinsurance encourages insureds to insure to value (e.g., 80%, 90%, or 100%) by penalizing underinsurance at the time of a loss.

Which Homeowners form provides the narrowest, modified settlement and is limited in covered perils for the dwelling?

1. HO-2
2. HO-3
3. HO-8 ✓
4. HO-6

Why: HO-8 is the Modified Coverage Form with restricted perils and functional/repair-cost settlement, designed for older homes; it is narrower than HO-2 or HO-3.

How does a standard commercial property deductible typically apply?

1. It applies only to personal property losses, never to the building itself
2. Per item of damaged property, with no aggregate cap
3. Per occurrence, subtracted from the loss after coinsurance is applied ✓
4. Per peril, and it doubles for theft losses

Why: The deductible applies per occurrence and is subtracted from the loss amount after any coinsurance adjustment is made.

An obligor receives reasonable proof of $1,400 of medical expense on 1 June and pays on 20 July. It also receives proof of $70 of a larger claim on 5 June and does not pay it separately. A second obligor elects to accumulate claims in 31-day periods and pays 20 days after each period ends.

1. None of the three is a problem: the 30-day period runs from the closing of the file rather than from receipt of reasonable proof, so a payment made on 20 July on proof received on 1 June is timely; a partial proof creates no obligation to pay anything until the whole of the claim has been proved, which is why the section speaks of proof of the fact AND AMOUNT of the loss; and an obligor that has elected to accumulate claims has 30 days after the close of each accumulation period, the election changing when the period starts rather than how long the obligor then has to make the payment once it does.
2. The first payment is overdue and the second obligor's practice is non-compliant, but the $70 part is also overdue: the $100 figure marks the threshold below which an obligor need not send a separate remittance advice with its payment, the obligation to pay attaching to any proven part of a claim however small, since benefits are payable monthly as loss accrues and accrual is measured by the expense incurred rather than by its size; an obligor free to hold small proven items back until the rest of the claim matured would defeat the monthly rhythm that the opening words of the subdivision lay down.
3. The first payment is overdue and bears interest at 15 percent, the $70 part is not yet overdue, and the second obligor's practice is compliant: the accumulation election substitutes a 31-day accumulation period plus a payment period measured in the same way as the ordinary 30 days, so a payment 20 days after the period closes is inside it; the shorter 15-day figure in the section governs the obligor's time to acknowledge a claim rather than to pay it, an obligor that has elected to accumulate having by definition already acknowledged everything it holds when the accumulation period closes.
4. The first payment is overdue and bears interest, the $70 part is not yet overdue, and the second obligor's practice is non-compliant: benefits are OVERDUE IF NOT PAID WITHIN 30 DAYS after the obligor receives reasonable proof of the fact and amount of loss, UNLESS the obligor elects to ACCUMULATE CLAIMS FOR PERIODS NOT EXCEEDING 31 DAYS AND PAYS THEM WITHIN 15 DAYS AFTER THE PERIOD OF ACCUMULATION; where reasonable proof is supplied as to only PART of a claim, THE PART IS OVERDUE ONLY IF IT TOTALS $100 OR MORE; and OVERDUE PAYMENTS SHALL BEAR SIMPLE INTEREST AT 15 PERCENT PER ANNUM. ✓

Why: Minn. Stat. 65B.54, subd. 1 sets the payment machinery. Basic economic loss benefits are PAYABLE MONTHLY AS LOSS ACCRUES, and loss accrues NOT WHEN INJURY OCCURS but as income loss, replacement services loss, survivor's economic loss, survivor's replacement services loss, or medical or funeral expense IS INCURRED. Benefits are OVERDUE if not paid within 30 DAYS after the obligor receives reasonable proof of the fact and amount of loss realized - unless the obligor ELECTS to accumulate claims for periods NOT EXCEEDING 31 DAYS and pays them WITHIN 15 DAYS AFTER the period of accumulation. Twenty days is outside that election. If reasonable proof is supplied as to only PART of a claim, AND THE PART TOTALS $100 OR MORE, that part is overdue if not paid in time; $70 does not reach the threshold. Subd. 2 fixes the price of lateness: overdue payments bear SIMPLE INTEREST AT THE RATE OF 15 PERCENT PER ANNUM. The same subdivision permits medical or funeral expense benefits to be paid directly to the persons supplying products, services or accommodations, requires health provider claims to be submitted under the uniform electronic transaction standards of section 62J.536, and provides that a health care provider CANNOT DIRECTLY BILL AN INSURED for a claim not remitted under those standards where the obligor is itself complying. Subd. 3 requires a claim to be PAID WITHOUT DEDUCTION for benefits that are to be subtracted under section 65B.61 if those benefits have not been paid before the reparation benefits are overdue, leaving the obligor to seek reimbursement afterwards - the claimant is not made to wait while coordination is worked out.

A homeowner telephones her insurer to ask whether her policy would cover a cracked patio and how a claim would be made. She makes no claim. At renewal the insurer removes her claim-free discount, saying no surcharge has been imposed because the base rate is unchanged.

1. The insurer is right: a discount is a rating concession the insurer may withdraw at any renewal, and the prohibition is aimed at an added charge, the base rate here being untouched and the two things being separate entries in every rating manual.
2. The insurer is right unless the inquiry was recorded as a claim: the prohibition attaches to the treatment of an inquiry as a loss, and an insurer that has merely reassessed a discretionary discount at its ordinary renewal review has not treated the call as anything at all; if the discount went for no reason, the remedy lies in the general prohibition on arbitrary and capricious action rather than in this section, which is aimed at a specific and identifiable act of surcharging a policy.
3. The insurer is wrong: AN INSURER MAY NOT IMPOSE A SURCHARGE ON HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE SOLELY AS A RESULT OF A CONSUMER INQUIRY, and SURCHARGE MEANS AN INCREASE IN PREMIUM FOR A POLICY, INCLUDING THE REMOVAL OF A CLAIM-FREE DISCOUNT; a CONSUMER INQUIRY is a communication that DOES NOT RESULT IN A PAID CLAIM and is in regard to the general terms or conditions of or coverage offered under a policy, INCLUDING A QUESTION CONCERNING THE PROCESS FOR FILING A CLAIM AND WHETHER A POLICY WILL COVER A LOSS. ✓
4. The insurer is wrong about the discount but right that no surcharge arose: withdrawing the discount increases what the insured pays and is prohibited on that account, while the defined term surcharge reaches only an addition to the rate, so the insured recovers the discount without any finding that a surcharge was imposed.

Why: Minn. Stat. 65A.285 is short and both of its subdivisions are needed to answer the insurer's argument. Subd. 1: AN INSURER MAY NOT IMPOSE A SURCHARGE ON HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE SOLELY AS A RESULT OF A CONSUMER INQUIRY. Subd. 2 then defines both operative terms, and each definition closes a loophole. CONSUMER INQUIRY MEANS A TELEPHONE CALL OR OTHER COMMUNICATION MADE TO AN INSURER THAT DOES NOT RESULT IN A PAID CLAIM AND THAT IS IN REGARD TO THE GENERAL TERMS OR CONDITIONS OF OR COVERAGE OFFERED UNDER AN INSURANCE POLICY. THE TERM INCLUDES A QUESTION CONCERNING THE PROCESS FOR FILING A CLAIM AND WHETHER A POLICY WILL COVER A LOSS - so asking how to claim, and asking whether a particular loss is covered, are both protected inquiries rather than the beginnings of a claim. SURCHARGE MEANS AN INCREASE IN PREMIUM FOR A POLICY, INCLUDING THE REMOVAL OF A CLAIM-FREE DISCOUNT - which is the insurer's argument answered in the statute's own words. The section belongs with section 65A.29, subd. 11, which forbids an insurer's nonrenewal plan from counting THE INSURED'S INQUIRY ABOUT A HYPOTHETICAL CLAIM, OR THE INSURED'S INQUIRY TO THE INSURED'S AGENT REGARDING A POTENTIAL CLAIM, and with section 72A.20, subd. 13, paragraph (a), clause (5), which makes it an unfair practice to refuse to renew SOLELY BECAUSE THE INSURED HAS INQUIRED ABOUT COVERAGE FOR A HYPOTHETICAL CLAIM. Three provisions, one policy: asking a question is not a claim.

An independent producer solicits a fire risk, takes the application, and misstates the distance to the nearest hydrant. The insurer issues a policy that, it later turns out, violates the standard policy sections. It argues the producer was the applicant's agent and that an unlawful policy binds nobody.

1. Both arguments fail: EVERY PERSON WHO SOLICITS INSURANCE AND PROCURES AN APPLICATION THEREFOR SHALL BE HELD TO BE THE AGENT OF THE PARTY AFTERWARD ISSUING INSURANCE THEREON OR A RENEWAL THEREOF; and NOTWITHSTANDING ANY PENALTY PRESCRIBED FOR THE MAKING, ISSUING, OR DELIVERY OF ANY POLICY IN VIOLATION OF ANY PROVISION OF LAW, EVERY SUCH POLICY SHALL BE BINDING UPON THE COMPANY ISSUING THE SAME. ✓
2. Both arguments succeed: an independent producer acts for the person who engages him to find cover, and a contract made in breach of a statute is unenforceable by either party, which is the ordinary consequence of illegality and the reason the chapter makes the issue of a non-conforming policy a gross misdemeanor.
3. The agency argument fails but the illegality argument succeeds: the producer is the company's agent by statute, so his misstatement about the hydrant is the company's own; but a policy issued in violation of the standard policy sections is void, since a statute making the issue of such a policy a gross misdemeanor cannot leave it in force, and the insured's remedy is a return of premium.
4. The agency argument succeeds but the illegality argument fails: a producer whom the insurer has never appointed cannot become its agent merely because it later issued a policy, the deeming provision reaching only a person who solicits for a company he already represents; but a non-conforming policy binds the company, which should not profit from its own breach.

Why: Four short sections at the end of the fire-policy run work together, and three of them answer this insurer. Minn. Stat. 65A.14: EVERY PERSON WHO SOLICITS INSURANCE AND PROCURES AN APPLICATION THEREFOR SHALL BE HELD TO BE THE AGENT OF THE PARTY AFTERWARD ISSUING INSURANCE THEREON OR A RENEWAL THEREOF. It is a deeming provision and it turns on conduct - soliciting and procuring - not on appointment, so a producer with no contract with the insurer is still the insurer's agent for the application he brought it. Minn. Stat. 65A.13: NOTWITHSTANDING ANY PENALTY PRESCRIBED FOR THE MAKING, ISSUING, OR DELIVERY OF ANY POLICY IN VIOLATION OF ANY PROVISION OF LAW, EVERY SUCH POLICY SHALL BE BINDING UPON THE COMPANY ISSUING THE SAME. The penalty and the validity of the contract are separated deliberately: the state punishes the company and the insured keeps the cover. Minn. Stat. 65A.15 supplies the penalty and says the same thing from the other end: EVERY COMPANY AND EVERY AGENT WHO SHALL WILLFULLY MAKE, ISSUE, OR DELIVER A POLICY IN VIOLATION OF SECTIONS 65A.01, 65A.02, AND 65A.03 SHALL BE GUILTY OF A GROSS MISDEMEANOR; BUT EVERY STIPULATION OF THE POLICY IN FAVOR OF THE INSURED SHALL, NEVERTHELESS, BE BINDING UPON THE COMPANY ISSUING THE SAME. Note that it reaches the AGENT as well as the company, and that what survives is every stipulation IN FAVOR OF THE INSURED - the insured takes the benefit of a policy the insurer had no right to issue. The fourth is Minn. Stat. 65A.12: a person who does not appoint a qualified appraiser WITHIN 20 DAYS AFTER WRITTEN REQUEST is, AT THE ELECTION OF THE OTHER PARTY, DEEMED TO HAVE WAIVED THE RIGHT TO APPRAISAL, and if it is the insurer it SHALL BE LIABLE TO SUIT; NO PERSON SHALL BE A QUALIFIED APPRAISER WHO IS NOT DISINTERESTED AND WILLING TO ACT.

A homeowner is nonrenewed after a neighbour tells the insurer he stores fuel in the garage. He sues the insurer over the statements in its nonrenewal notice, sues the neighbour over what the neighbour told the insurer, and separately alleges an unfair trade practice under the insurance code.

1. All three are barred: the immunity is expressed as covering any cause of action of any nature arising from statements made in a written notice of declination, nonrenewal or cancellation or from the furnishing of information relating to it, which takes in the neighbour who supplied the reason, and an unfair trade practice claim is a cause of action arising from those same statements.
2. Only the claim against the insurer is barred by this subdivision: there shall be NO LIABILITY and NO CAUSE OF ACTION OF ANY NATURE against the commissioner, the insurer, its authorized representative, agents or employees, OR ANY FIRM, PERSON OR CORPORATION FURNISHING TO THE INSURED INFORMATION AS TO REASONS for declination, nonrenewal or cancellation - the neighbour furnished information TO THE INSURER and is not among the persons this subdivision names; and THIS SUBDIVISION SHALL NOT APPLY TO ANY ACTION OR PROCEEDING ARISING UNDER SECTION 72A.20. ✓
3. The claim against the insurer and the claim against the neighbour are both barred, and only the unfair trade practice proceeding survives: the subdivision protects everyone in the chain by which a reason reaches an insured, whoever they told it to first, and the single exception it makes is for proceedings under section 72A.20; a narrower reading would leave the informant who set the process going as the one person exposed to suit.
4. The claim against the insurer is barred, the claim against the neighbour is not, and the unfair trade practice proceeding is barred as well: the immunity is drawn by reference to the persons the statute requires to give notice, and its purpose is to protect them from being sued for doing what it commands; an outside informant does nothing the statute requires, while a proceeding brought by the commissioner rather than by the insured is not a cause of action in the sense the subdivision uses and so falls inside the immunity rather than outside it.

Why: Minn. Stat. 65A.29, subd. 6 grants an immunity in almost the same words as its automobile counterpart in section 65B.20, and then does one thing that section does not. The grant: THERE SHALL BE NO LIABILITY ON THE PART OF AND NO CAUSE OF ACTION OF ANY NATURE SHALL ARISE AGAINST THE COMMISSIONER OR AGAINST ANY INSURER, ITS AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE, ITS AGENTS, ITS EMPLOYEES OR ANY FIRM, PERSON OR CORPORATION FURNISHING TO THE INSURED INFORMATION AS TO REASONS FOR DECLINATION, NONRENEWAL, OR CANCELLATION, FOR ANY STATEMENT MADE BY THEM IN ANY WRITTEN NOTICE of declination, nonrenewal or cancellation, FOR THE PROVIDING OF INFORMATION RELATING THERETO, OR FOR STATEMENTS MADE OR EVIDENCE SUBMITTED AT ANY HEARINGS OR INVESTIGATIONS CONDUCTED IN CONNECTION THEREWITH. Read that list carefully: the outsider it protects is one FURNISHING TO THE INSURED information as to reasons. Its automobile counterpart, section 65B.20, protects a firm, person or corporation FURNISHING TO THE INSURER information as to reasons for nonrenewal or cancellation - the opposite direction - so a neighbour who reports a risk to an insurer is inside the automobile immunity and is not among the persons this subdivision names. Then the carve-out that has no automobile equivalent: THIS SUBDIVISION SHALL NOT APPLY TO ANY ACTION OR PROCEEDING ARISING UNDER SECTION 72A.20. That is the unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts section, and section 72A.20, subd. 13 is the provision that makes it an unfair practice to refuse to write or renew homeowner's insurance on certain grounds. The immunity therefore protects an insurer against a private action over what its notice said, and leaves it fully exposed to the unfair trade practice regime for the decision the notice recorded - which is the balance the drafter intended, since an immunity that also covered section 72A.20 would have made subd. 13 unenforceable.

A man dies 14 months after the accident from injuries received in it. His widow, with whom he lived, and his 20-year-old son, who is neither incapacitated nor receiving support, claim survivors economic loss benefits. The widow also claims for lawn care the deceased used to do.

1. Nothing is payable on these facts: survivors economic loss benefits are available only in the event of DEATH OCCURRING WITHIN ONE YEAR OF THE DATE OF THE ACCIDENT, caused by and arising out of injuries received in it, so a death at 14 months falls outside the benefit altogether, and survivors replacement services loss depends on the same death. ✓
2. The widow recovers on both heads and the son does not: a wife who lives with her husband at the time of his death is presumed dependent on him, the one-year limit governs the PRESENTATION of the claim rather than the date of the death, and lawn care is an ordinary and necessary service the deceased would have performed for the survivors' benefit, recoverable as survivors replacement services loss up to $200 a week.
3. The widow recovers survivors economic loss but not replacement services, and the son recovers nothing: the presumption of dependency covers a wife living with her husband at his death, but replacement services loss is confined to services the deceased performed FOR INCOME, lawn care done for the family's own benefit falling outside it, and a 20-year-old who is neither incapacitated nor supported is within no presumption at all.
4. The widow and the son both recover: the one-year rule is as described but is satisfied here because the injuries were received within the year, the statute measuring the period from the accident to the INJURY rather than to the death; and a child over 18 is presumed dependent on the parent with whom the child was living, the requirement of physical or mental incapacity applying only to a claim brought by the child in the child's own name after the age of majority.

Why: Minn. Stat. 65B.44, subd. 6 opens with the condition that disposes of this claim: survivors economic loss benefits are payable IN THE EVENT OF DEATH OCCURRING WITHIN ONE YEAR OF THE DATE OF THE ACCIDENT, caused by and arising out of injuries received in the accident. Fourteen months is outside it, and the presumptions of dependency never come into play. Had the death been in time, the benefit is subject to a MAXIMUM OF $500 PER WEEK and covers loss accruing AFTER the decedent's death of contributions of money or tangible things of economic value, NOT INCLUDING SERVICES, that surviving dependents would have received for their support during their dependency. Four classes are PRESUMED dependent: a wife on a husband with whom she lives at the time of his death; a husband on a wife with whom he lives at the time of her death; any child under 18, OR OVER THAT AGE BUT PHYSICALLY OR MENTALLY INCAPACITATED FROM EARNING, on the parent with whom the child is living or from whom the child is receiving support regularly at the time of the death; and an actual dependent who lives with the decedent at the time of death. A 20-year-old who is neither incapacitated nor supported is not within any of them. Payments are terminated whenever the recipient ceases to maintain a status that would be dependency if the decedent were alive. The lawn care would have belonged to subd. 7, SURVIVORS REPLACEMENT SERVICES LOSS - expenses reasonably incurred by surviving dependents after the death in obtaining ordinary and necessary services in lieu of those the deceased would have performed for their benefit, MINUS expenses avoided by reason of the death, subject to a maximum of $200 per week - and it too depends on a death the Act recognises.

Which of the following best states the purpose of the deductible in Section I of a Homeowners policy?

1. To pay the mortgagee its share of the loss before the insured receives any portion of the settlement
2. To increase coverage by the deductible amount at each renewal
3. To cover liability claims under Section II before Coverage E responds
4. To eliminate small claims and reduce premium by having the insured retain part of each loss ✓

Why: The Section I property deductible has the insured retain a portion of each loss, discouraging small claims and lowering premium; it does not apply to Section II liability.

The CGL's coverage for 'damage to premises rented to you' generally does NOT apply to:

1. Damage the insured causes to premises it owns ✓
2. Fire damage to a building rented to the insured
3. Lightning damage to rented premises
4. Explosion or smoke damage to short-term rented premises

Why: This coverage applies to rented premises, not to property the insured owns, which would need property insurance.

Under a Homeowners HO-4 (renters) policy, the Coverage A (Dwelling) limit is typically:

1. Always set at 80% of the Coverage C limit to satisfy the coinsurance requirement
2. Equal to the building's replacement cost, with the landlord's policy applying excess of it
3. Not applicable / minimal, since the tenant does not own the building ✓
4. The largest of the Section I limits

Why: Because tenants do not own the structure, HO-4 has no meaningful Coverage A; the emphasis is on Coverage C personal property and Section II liability.

With auto liability split limits of 50/100/25, the maximum paid for bodily injury to any one person in an accident is:

1. $100,000
2. $50,000 ✓
3. $175,000
4. $25,000

Why: The first number (50) is the per-person bodily injury limit: $50,000.

A candidate is asked what the Minnesota FAIR plan is for, and in particular whether it exists to take business away from the private market, whether property may be refused because of its condition, and whether it does anything other than issue policies.

1. It exists to ENCOURAGE MAXIMUM USE OF THE NORMAL INSURANCE MARKET provided by the private industry; NO PROPERTY IS DENIED PROPERTY OR LIABILITY INSURANCE THROUGH THE FAIR PLAN DUE TO THE CONDITION OF THE PROPERTY, EXCEPT AFTER A PHYSICAL INSPECTION AND A FAIR EVALUATION OF ITS INDIVIDUAL UNDERWRITING CHARACTERISTICS; and it also administers A REINSURANCE ARRANGEMENT WHEREBY PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURERS SHARE EQUITABLY THE RESPONSIBILITY for insuring insurable property that the normal markets will not take. ✓
2. It exists to replace the private market for substandard property, condition is a permitted ground of refusal without any inspection, and it does nothing but issue policies: a residual market is by definition the insurer of last resort, and its function is exhausted once the risk has been written and the premium collected.
3. It exists to encourage stability in the property and liability insurance market and nothing more: the other five clauses of the purposes section describe the methods by which the plan works rather than the objects it exists to serve, so the plan may decline any property it chooses provided it records a reason for the file; and the reinsurance arrangement under which member companies share the responsibility for insurable property is a private treaty among them which the statute leaves entirely to their agreement rather than to the plan's administration.
4. It exists to encourage maximum use of the normal market and to inspect a property before refusing it on condition, but it operates no reinsurance arrangement: the members bear the plan's losses through assessments levied under the plan of operation rather than through reinsurance, which is a different mechanism, and a reinsurance arrangement would require the plan to be licensed as an insurer in its own right; the reference to sharing responsibility describes that assessment machinery in general terms rather than a treaty the plan itself administers.

Why: Minn. Stat. 65A.32 states six purposes for sections 65A.31 to 65A.42 and they are worth knowing as a set, because each explains a later section. (1) TO ENCOURAGE STABILITY IN THE PROPERTY AND LIABILITY INSURANCE MARKET FOR PROPERTY LOCATED IN THIS STATE. (2) TO ENCOURAGE MAXIMUM USE, IN OBTAINING PROPERTY AND LIABILITY INSURANCE, OF THE NORMAL INSURANCE MARKET PROVIDED BY THE PRIVATE PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE INDUSTRY - the plan is a supplement to the market and not a competitor of it, which is why section 65A.34, subd. 1 opens the plan only to a person WHO HAS BEEN CANCELED, NONRENEWED, OR OTHERWISE REJECTED FOR COVERAGE IN THE PRIVATE MARKET. (3) TO ENCOURAGE THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE CONDITION OF PROPERTIES LOCATED IN THIS STATE AND TO FURTHER ORDERLY COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT GENERALLY - the reason the plan uses condition charges and tells an applicant what improvements would remove them. (4) TO PROVIDE FOR AN ORGANIZATION KNOWN AS THE MINNESOTA FAIR PLAN, WHICH WILL ASSURE FAIR ACCESS TO INSURANCE REQUIREMENTS IN ORDER THAT NO PROPERTY IS DENIED PROPERTY OR LIABILITY INSURANCE THROUGH THE FAIR PLAN DUE TO THE CONDITION OF THE PROPERTY, EXCEPT AFTER A PHYSICAL INSPECTION OF THE PROPERTY AND A FAIR EVALUATION OF ITS INDIVIDUAL UNDERWRITING CHARACTERISTICS - which is the source of the inspection requirement in section 65A.34, subd. 2. FAIR is an acronym of that purpose. (5) TO PUBLICIZE THE PURPOSES AND PROCEDURES OF THE FAIR PLAN TO THE END THAT NO ONE MAY FAIL TO SEEK ITS ASSISTANCE THROUGH LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OF ITS EXISTENCE. (6) TO PROVIDE FOR THE FORMULATION AND ADMINISTRATION BY THE MINNESOTA FAIR PLAN OF A REINSURANCE ARRANGEMENT WHEREBY PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURERS SHARE EQUITABLY THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INSURING INSURABLE PROPERTY FOR WHICH PROPERTY AND LIABILITY INSURANCE CANNOT BE OBTAINED THROUGH THE NORMAL INSURANCE MARKETS. Section 65A.35, subd. 2 repeats purposes (4) and (6) as the plan's own two functions.

Under the PAP, a "temporary substitute auto" used while the covered auto is being repaired is treated as:

1. A non-owned auto, which the PAP leaves entirely uninsured
2. Excluded outright once the covered auto goes into the shop
3. A covered auto, picking up the coverages that applied to the disabled vehicle ✓
4. Covered for Part A liability only, never for damage to the substitute itself

Why: A temporary substitute for a covered auto out of service (for repair, breakdown, etc.) is covered with the same coverages as the vehicle it replaces.

A boatowner wants liability protection for bodily injury to others caused by the vessel. This is provided under the yacht policy's:

1. Hull coverage
2. Medical payments to the owner only
3. Flood coverage
4. Protection and indemnity (P&I) coverage ✓

Why: Protection and indemnity coverage in a yacht policy provides liability protection for bodily injury and property damage to others arising from operation of the vessel.

The Homeowners fire department service charge additional coverage typically reimburses up to about:

1. 10% of Coverage A
2. $2,500
3. $500 ✓
4. $5,000

Why: The fire department service charge additional coverage commonly reimburses up to $500 with no deductible when a fire department is called to save covered property.

A storage owner trains his staff himself using a short in-house handout, advertises the facility as offering “our own insurance agents on site”, and has begun offering the cover to members of the public who are not renting space, on the footing that the goods will be stored with him eventually.

1. Two things are wrong - the advertising and the sales to non-renters - but the training is a matter for the owner: the section requires a programme giving basic instruction about its provisions and the kinds of coverage, and leaves its form to the owner precisely because the owner assumes responsibility for the authorised actions of the staff who deliver it, approval being required only of the customer-facing materials.
2. Three things are wrong: the training programme must be submitted to the commissioner for approval; an owner must not advertise, represent or otherwise portray itself or its employees or agents as licensed insurers or insurance producers; and insurance may be offered or sold only in connection with and incidental to the rental of space at the facility. ✓
3. Two things are wrong - the training and the sales to non-renters - but the advertising is not: the prohibition bars an owner from portraying itself as a licensed INSURER, the reference to producers going to the separate bar on holding a licence, so describing unlicensed staff as agents of the owner is accurate rather than prohibited.
4. One thing is wrong: the sales to non-renters. The training programme must be provided but need not be submitted, and the advertising restriction bites only where a customer is actually misled, the section being directed at the effect of the representation rather than at its form.

Why: Minn. Stat. 60K.60 subd. 2(g) requires each owner to “provide a training program, which must be submitted to the commissioner for approval, that gives employees and agents of the owner basic instruction about the provisions of this section, including the kinds of insurance coverage described in this section” - submission for approval is part of the requirement, which the second and fourth options drop. Paragraph (h) contains two prohibitions: an owner shall not “(1) offer or sell insurance except in connection with and incidental to the rental of space at a self-service storage facility; or (2) advertise, represent, or otherwise portray itself or any of its employees or agents as licensed insurers or insurance producers”. Both licensed insurers and insurance producers are named in clause (2), and the employees and agents are named alongside the owner, which is the third option's error; the prohibition is on the representation rather than on its effect, which is the fourth option's. Paragraph (f) supplies the background the second option relies on and misuses: an employee or agent may act on behalf of and under the supervision of the owner, and conduct within the scope of employment or agency “is deemed the conduct of the owner for purposes of this section”.

A claimant's damages are $500,000. The at-fault car was owned by a hire company and driven with permission by a customer. The owner's liability policy pays $100,000 and the driver's own liability policy pays a further $50,000. The claimant's underinsured motorist limit is $400,000.

1. Only the owner's payment is credited, so $400,000 is payable: the underinsured motor vehicle is identified by its owner's cover, and a payment made by the driver's separate insurer is a collateral recovery the claimant is entitled to keep, the calculation being capped at her limit.
2. Only the driver's payment is credited, so $400,000 is payable: it is the driver whose negligence caused the loss and whose policy therefore stands in the claimant's way, an owner's policy on a hired vehicle being a separate protection for the hire company rather than a recovery from the at-fault vehicle, and the figure is in any event capped at her limit; crediting an owner's policy as well would make the claimant's recovery depend on how the hire company chose to arrange its own insurance.
3. Neither payment is credited, so $400,000 is payable: the subdivision measures the maximum liability by the damages the claimant sustained, and the credit it describes operates only where the same insurer is on both sides of the claim.
4. Both payments are credited, so $350,000 is payable: the maximum liability of the underinsured motorist insurer is THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES SUSTAINED BUT NOT RECOVERED FROM THE INSURANCE POLICY OF THE DRIVER OR OWNER OF ANY UNDERINSURED AT FAULT VEHICLE - the subdivision names the policy of the DRIVER OR OWNER, so both recoveries reduce the claim, and $500,000 less $150,000 is inside the $400,000 limit. ✓

Why: Minn. Stat. 65B.49, subd. 4a describes the credit by naming two possible sources: the maximum liability of an insurer is THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES SUSTAINED BUT NOT RECOVERED FROM THE INSURANCE POLICY OF THE DRIVER OR OWNER OF ANY UNDERINSURED AT FAULT VEHICLE. DRIVER OR OWNER covers the common case of a borrowed, hired or company vehicle, where the person driving and the person owning are insured separately and both policies may answer. Money recovered from either is money the claimant has recovered from the at-fault vehicle's side of the accident, and the subdivision credits it. $500,000 less the $100,000 from the owner's policy and the $50,000 from the driver's is $350,000. The third sentence then caps the result - IN NO EVENT SHALL THE UNDERINSURED MOTORIST CARRIER HAVE TO PAY MORE THAN THE AMOUNT OF ITS UNDERINSURED MOTORIST LIMITS - and $350,000 is inside the $400,000 limit, so the ceiling does not operate. Note what the credit is measured against: sums recovered FROM THE INSURANCE POLICY of the driver or owner. The subdivision is describing the liability insurance on the at-fault side, which is the same thing subd. 4a's first words are about when they speak of an UNDERINSURED AT FAULT VEHICLE.

An out-of-state insurer writes a liability policy on a car later driven into Minnesota. The policy says nothing about basic economic loss benefits and its terms exclude them. An accident happens in Minnesota. A separate insurer applying for a Minnesota licence asks what it must file.

1. The out-of-state policy does not include the coverages and the applicant need file nothing: a contract of insurance is governed by the law of the state in which it was issued and delivered, so a liability policy written elsewhere carries the coverages that state requires and no others, the Minnesota claimant's protection in such a case being the assigned claims plan under sections 65B.63 and 65B.64 rather than a term read into a foreign contract; the certification requirement was a transitional filing tied to the Act's commencement on 1 January 1975 and spent itself upon the insurers then licensed, which is why the subdivision fixes that date, an insurer applying today satisfying the commissioner of its compliance through the ordinary rate and form filings made under chapter 60A; reading the section otherwise would give the commissioner power over a contract made and performed in another state, which is the very difficulty the assigned claims machinery was built to avoid.
2. The out-of-state policy includes the required coverages by operation of law, and the applicant must file a written certification: NOTWITHSTANDING ANY CONTRARY PROVISION IN IT, EVERY CONTRACT OF LIABILITY INSURANCE FOR INJURY, WHEREVER ISSUED, covering obligations arising from ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle - except one providing coverage only for liability IN EXCESS of required minimum tort liability coverages - INCLUDES BASIC ECONOMIC LOSS BENEFIT COVERAGES AND RESIDUAL LIABILITY COVERAGES required by the Act WHILE THE VEHICLE IS IN THIS STATE, and QUALIFIES AS SECURITY COVERING THE VEHICLE; and every insurer licensed to write motor vehicle accident reparation and liability insurance here shall, AS A CONDITION OF LICENSING, FILE AND THEREAFTER MAINTAIN A WRITTEN CERTIFICATION that it will afford at least the minimum security provided by section 65B.49 to all policyholders. ✓
3. The out-of-state policy includes the coverages, but the applicant's certification may be limited to resident policyholders: the reading-in operates by force of the statute while the vehicle is in this state, whatever the contract says to the contrary, so the accident here is covered; but an insurer certifies as to the policyholders whose contracts this state regulates, and the concession in the subdivision for nonresident policyholders identifies those to whom the certification does not extend rather than reducing what must be certified about them; on any other reading a Minnesota licence would carry a promise about the minimum security afforded to policyholders in every state where the insurer writes, a promise the commissioner could neither test nor enforce, and the subdivision would have said as much in terms instead of disposing of nonresidents in a single qualifying clause at the end of it.
4. The out-of-state policy includes the coverages and the applicant must certify, but an excess liability contract is included too: the exception in the section is for a contract providing coverage only for liability in excess of the required minimum, which describes an umbrella written above a primary Minnesota policy rather than a policy written elsewhere, since a policy that is the only coverage on the vehicle cannot sensibly be described as excess of anything and the exception would otherwise let an insurer escape the section by labelling its product; the certification requirement points the same way, since an insurer certifies as to the minimum security it will afford to all policyholders and an excess writer affords none, so the two subdivisions read together confine the exception to a genuine umbrella sitting above a complying primary policy which is already in force upon the same vehicle when the loss occurs.

Why: Minn. Stat. 65B.50, subd. 2 is one of the most powerful sentences in the Act, and it works without the insured or the insurer doing anything. NOTWITHSTANDING ANY CONTRARY PROVISION IN IT, every contract of liability insurance for injury, WHEREVER ISSUED, covering obligations arising from ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle - except a contract which provides coverage ONLY for liability IN EXCESS of required minimum tort liability coverages - INCLUDES the basic economic loss benefit coverages and residual liability coverages required by sections 65B.41 to 65B.71 WHILE THE VEHICLE IS IN THIS STATE, and QUALIFIES AS SECURITY COVERING THE VEHICLE. The policy's own exclusion is overridden; the coverage is read in for the period the vehicle is here. Subd. 1 is the licensing condition: every insurer licensed to write motor vehicle accident reparation and liability insurance in this state shall, on or before 1 January 1975 OR AS A CONDITION TO SUCH LICENSING, file with the commissioner AND THEREAFTER MAINTAIN a written certification that it will afford at least the minimum security provided by section 65B.49 TO ALL POLICYHOLDERS - so the duty is continuing and attaches to every new licensee, not just to insurers writing in 1975. The one concession is for nonresident policyholders, as to whom the insurer NEED ONLY CERTIFY THAT SECURITY IS PROVIDED WITH RESPECT TO ACCIDENTS OCCURRING IN THIS STATE. Read together, the two subdivisions close the gap from both ends: the licensed insurer promises the coverage in advance, and any liability contract that finds its way into Minnesota supplies it whether or not anyone promised anything.

Which of the following is typically EXCLUDED property under the BPP?

1. Office furniture
2. Tenant's improvements
3. Money and securities ✓
4. Stock for sale

Why: Money and securities are excluded from the BPP; they require a crime policy or special form. The other items are covered property.

A company decides to stop writing a line that accounts for 80 percent of the business one agency places with it. It sends the agency's homeowners policyholders a notice of nonrenewal which invites them to buy direct from the company. The agency says the company has terminated it and has done something else wrong as well.

1. Both points are good: a cancellation or termination of an agent's contract is considered to have occurred if the company cancels a line of business or a volume of business equal to or exceeding 75 percent of the business the agent placed with it; and upon termination of an agency a company is prohibited from soliciting business in the notice of nonrenewal. ✓
2. The first point is good and the second is not: the deeming provision is engaged because the cancelled line is 80 percent of the business the agency placed with the company and so exceeds 75 percent, but nothing stops a company describing its own products to its own policyholders, the prohibition on soliciting business attaching to the notice of TERMINATION the company sends the agent rather than to the nonrenewal notice sent to the insureds.
3. The second point is good and the first is not: soliciting business in the notice of nonrenewal is prohibited, but a decision to stop writing a line altogether is a change in the company's own appetite rather than the cancellation of anybody's agency contract, the deeming provision reaching only a company that cancels this agent's authority for a line or a volume equal to or exceeding 75 percent while continuing to write that line through other agents.
4. Both points are good, and the threshold is lower than the agency supposes: a cancellation is deemed to occur where the company cancels a line or a volume equal to or exceeding 50 percent of the business the agent placed with it, 75 percent being the point at which the company must also offer to renew the affected policies.

Why: Minn. Stat. 60A.171 subd. 12 provides that “for purposes of this section, a cancellation or termination of an agent's contract is considered to have occurred if the company cancels a line of insurance business or a volume of insurance business that equals or exceeds 75 percent of the insurance business placed by that agent with the company”. Eighty percent is above that, so the deeming operates; the threshold is 75 rather than 50, which is the fourth option's invention, and it is engaged by the cancellation of a LINE as well as of a volume, which is what the third option denies. Subdivision 11 answers the second point: “Upon termination of an agency, a company is prohibited from soliciting business in the notice of nonrenewal required by section 60A.37.” The notice referred to is the nonrenewal notice sent to the policyholder, not a notice sent to the agent, which is the second option's substitution. The same subdivision goes on to require, where termination of an agency contract is the ground for nonrenewal of a homeowner's policy as defined in section 65A.27 subd. 4, that the company tell the policyholder the reason, that the agent notify the policyholder of the right to renew with the terminating company if the agency cannot place the risk elsewhere, and that the company renew on a written request made before the renewal date.

A driver is forced off the road by a car that does not stop and is never traced. Her insurer says a phantom vehicle is neither uninsured nor underinsured, so neither coverage responds. A second insured asks whether he can claim under either coverage for a crash in which he was wholly at fault.

1. Neither claimant recovers: both coverages protect only persons LEGALLY ENTITLED TO RECOVER DAMAGES FOR BODILY INJURY from the owner or operator of the vehicle concerned, and a claimant who cannot identify the car that forced her off the road can establish an entitlement against no owner and no operator, there being nobody to sue and no judgment she could ever enforce; that is why the untraced-vehicle case is routed to the assigned claims plan instead of to either motorist coverage, and the second claimant fails on the same words, having no entitlement against anyone but himself.
2. The first claimant recovers under uninsured motorist coverage and the second recovers under neither: UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE means coverage for the protection of persons insured under that coverage WHO ARE LEGALLY ENTITLED TO RECOVER DAMAGES FOR BODILY INJURY FROM OWNERS OR OPERATORS OF UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLES AND HIT-AND-RUN MOTOR VEHICLES, while UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE names only owners or operators of UNDERINSURED motor vehicles; and the driver at fault in his own crash is not legally entitled to recover damages from anyone. ✓
3. Both claimants recover: the coverages are first-party benefits paid by the insured's own obligor, and the reference to legal entitlement identifies the class of loss covered rather than imposing a condition of fault, so an untraced car and a single-vehicle crash each fall inside the protection the premium was paid for.
4. The first claimant recovers under underinsured motorist coverage and the second under uninsured motorist coverage: an untraced car is treated as carrying a nil limit, which is less than the amount needed to compensate the insured for actual damages, so it answers the underinsured definition rather than the uninsured one; and a driver at fault in his own crash is treated as injured by an uninsured motor vehicle, no liability policy standing behind the claim he makes, which is the gap the uninsured coverage was written to close and the reason it is the broader of the two protections an owner must carry.

Why: Minn. Stat. 65B.43, subds 18 and 19 are drafted in parallel and differ in one respect that decides the first claim. Subd. 18: UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE means coverage for the protection of persons insured under that coverage WHO ARE LEGALLY ENTITLED TO RECOVER DAMAGES FOR BODILY INJURY FROM OWNERS OR OPERATORS OF UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLES AND HIT-AND-RUN MOTOR VEHICLES. Subd. 19: UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE means coverage for the protection of persons insured under that coverage WHO ARE LEGALLY ENTITLED TO RECOVER DAMAGES FOR BODILY INJURY FROM OWNERS OR OPERATORS OF UNDERINSURED MOTOR VEHICLES. HIT-AND-RUN MOTOR VEHICLES appear in subd. 18 and nowhere in subd. 19, and that is the answer to the insurer's argument: the untraced car is a hit-and-run motor vehicle and uninsured motorist coverage names that case expressly. The words the two share matter just as much. Each protects only persons LEGALLY ENTITLED TO RECOVER DAMAGES FOR BODILY INJURY from the owner or operator of such a vehicle, so both coverages are keyed to a tort entitlement against somebody else. A driver injured in a crash that was wholly his own fault has no such entitlement and neither coverage reaches him, whatever his own limits are. Both definitions also speak of BODILY INJURY, which is why neither coverage answers a property damage claim.

A Minnesota domestic property and casualty insurer prepares its risk-based capital report. On 20 February it receives a written request from the insurance commissioner of another state in which it is authorised to do business, asking that the report be filed there too. It asks by when each filing must be made.

1. The report must be submitted to the Minnesota commissioner on or before March 1, and filed with the NAIC according to the risk-based capital instructions; and the filing with the requesting state must be made not later than the LATER of fifteen days from receipt of that state's notice or March 1. ✓
2. The report must be submitted to the Minnesota commissioner on or before April 1, and filed with the NAIC; and the filing with the requesting state must be made not later than the EARLIER of fifteen days from receipt of the notice or April 1, so that the out-of-state filing is always made first.
3. The report must be submitted to the Minnesota commissioner on or before March 1 and filed with the NAIC; but a request from another state's commissioner has no effect unless that state has entered a reciprocal filing agreement with Minnesota, in which case the report is filed there on the same date as here.
4. The report must be submitted to the Minnesota commissioner on or before March 1 and filed with the NAIC; and the filing with the requesting state must be made within fifteen days of receipt of that state's notice in every case, the March 1 date being irrelevant to the out-of-state filing however early in the year the notice arrives.

Why: Minn. Stat. 60A.61 subd. 1 requires every domestic insurer, “on or before each March 1”, to prepare and submit to the commissioner a report of its risk-based capital levels as of the end of the calendar year just ended, in the form and containing the information the risk-based capital instructions require. It must in addition file that report with the NAIC according to those instructions, and with the insurance commissioner of any state in which it is authorised to do business “if the insurance commissioner has notified the insurer of its request in writing”. The timing of that third filing is a LATER-OF test: “not later than the later of (i) 15 days from the receipt of notice to file its risk-based capital report with that state; or (ii) March 1.” A notice received on 20 February therefore does not compress the deadline to 7 March or push it forward to 20 February — the later of the two is taken, which here is 7 March. The fourth option drops the second limb and the second option inverts the test into an earlier-of. No reciprocal agreement is required, which is the third option's invention: a written request suffices. TWO NEIGHBOURING DEADLINES MUST NOT BE MERGED WITH THIS ONE. Section 60A.13 subd. 1 also uses March 1, but for the ANNUAL STATEMENT rather than the RBC report. And section 60A.51, the parallel provision for a domestic HEALTH ORGANIZATION in the separate RBC block at sections 60A.50 to 60A.592, sets APRIL 1 with the same fifteen-day alternative. Three filings, two dates, three provisions.

A producer takes an accredited classroom course preparing for a professional designation examination, sits the examination and fails it. She claims continuing education credit for the classroom hours and asks what she could have claimed had she passed.

1. She may claim neither: credit for a professional designation examination and for the instruction leading to it is available only on passing, so a failed attempt carries nothing and the classroom hours are absorbed into the examination credit whatever the outcome, the two being treated as a single accredited undertaking for this purpose.
2. She may claim the classroom hours, having taken an accredited course; had she passed she could have claimed full credit for the examination instead, but a producer may not receive credit for classroom instruction preparing for the examination and also receive credit for passing it. ✓
3. She may claim the classroom hours and, had she passed, could have claimed both those hours and the credit for passing: the restriction in the section prevents a producer claiming the same hours twice within one licensing period rather than preventing the two different credits being claimed together.
4. She may claim the classroom hours; had she passed, the credit for the examination would have been available only if the examination had been approved by the commissioner on the recommendation of the advisory task force AND she had first obtained the commissioner's agreement to forgo the classroom credit before sitting it.

Why: Minn. Stat. 60K.56 subd. 1 defines a “professional designation examination” as “a written, proctored, and graded examination the passage of which leads to a bona fide insurance or financial planning professional designation used by insurance producers”. Subdivision 5(b) provides that the commissioner “shall approve or disapprove professional designation examinations that are recommended for approval by the advisory task force”; that “in order for an insurance producer to receive full continuing education credit for a professional designation examination, the producer must pass the examination”; and that “a producer may not receive credit for classroom instruction preparing for the professional designation examination and also receive continuing education credit for passing the professional designation examination”. The bar is on taking both credits, not on claiming the same hours twice, which is the third option's misreading. Nothing makes the classroom credit contingent on the examination result, so the second option's absorption is an invention, and nothing requires an election in advance, which is the fourth option's.

A customer slips on a wet floor in the insured's store and is hurt. This is most clearly a claim under:

1. Employee Benefits Liability
2. Coverage A — Premises and Operations ✓
3. Coverage B — Personal and Advertising Injury
4. A surety bond

Why: A slip-and-fall on the insured's premises is a Coverage A bodily injury (premises and operations) claim.

Under the GLBA privacy rule, an insurer that intends to share a customer's nonpublic personal financial information with a nonaffiliated third party generally must first:

1. Obtain a court order approving transfer of the customer's file to the recipient
2. File a notice with FEMA
3. Cancel the policy before any data changes hands
4. Provide a privacy notice and the opportunity to opt out ✓

Why: GLBA requires insurers to deliver a privacy notice and, before sharing nonpublic personal information with nonaffiliated third parties, give the consumer a chance to opt out.

Four unrelated students share a rented house and want one renter's policy between them. All four meet the insurer's normal underwriting requirements and are willing to be named. The insurer says it writes renter's policies for a household, not for a group of strangers.

1. The insurer may refuse: a residential renter's package policy insures a household, and four unrelated tenants are four separate insurable interests which the insurer is entitled to underwrite and rate separately.
2. The insurer may refuse only if it can show a sound underwriting reason: the section leaves the decision to the insurer's judgement while requiring that judgement to be exercised on the merits, so an insurer with a rating basis for declining a shared tenancy has complied and one with no reason at all has not; the number of tenants is relevant only as evidence of the size of the risk.
3. The insurer may not refuse, and the same rule applies however many tenants there are: the figure of four describes the ordinary case the legislature had in mind rather than a ceiling on the obligation, and an insurer that must write one policy for four unrelated people can have no principled objection to writing one for five; the operative conditions are that all are named and that all meet the insurer's normal underwriting requirements.
4. The insurer may not refuse: NO INSURER SHALL REFUSE TO ISSUE A SINGLE RESIDENTIAL RENTER'S INSURANCE POLICY FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROVIDING COVERAGE TO UP TO FOUR INDIVIDUALS RESIDING IN THE SAME HOUSEHOLD, IF ALL OF THE INDIVIDUALS ARE NAMED INSUREDS ON THE POLICY AND MEET THE INSURER'S NORMAL UNDERWRITING REQUIREMENTS. ✓

Why: Minn. Stat. 65A.45 is one sentence with a number in it and two conditions attached: NO INSURER SHALL REFUSE TO ISSUE A SINGLE RESIDENTIAL RENTER'S INSURANCE POLICY FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROVIDING COVERAGE TO UP TO FOUR INDIVIDUALS RESIDING IN THE SAME HOUSEHOLD, IF ALL OF THE INDIVIDUALS ARE NAMED INSUREDS ON THE POLICY AND MEET THE INSURER'S NORMAL UNDERWRITING REQUIREMENTS. UP TO FOUR is a ceiling, not an illustration, so the last distractor overshoots the section; and both conditions must be satisfied, so an insurer faced with an applicant who does not meet its normal underwriting requirements is not compelled by this section to take him. What the section removes is the objection that a policy cannot be written for several unrelated people sharing a tenancy. Minn. Stat. 65A.44 supplies the two definitions the section runs on, and confines them to these two sections: INSURER MEANS AN INSURER LICENSED TO WRITE INSURANCE AND WRITING RESIDENTIAL RENTER'S INSURANCE IN THIS STATE, and RESIDENTIAL RENTER'S INSURANCE POLICY MEANS INSURANCE COVERAGE NORMALLY WRITTEN BY THE INSURER AS A STANDARD RESIDENTIAL RENTER'S PACKAGE POLICY. Note that a renter's policy is also HOMEOWNER'S INSURANCE for the purposes of section 65A.27, subd. 4, which names a standard residential renter's package policy in terms - so a renter has the benefit of the cancellation, nonrenewal and declination protections as well as this one.

Which CGL limit is the most that will be paid for the sum of all damages because of bodily injury and property damage arising out of any one occurrence?

1. Each Occurrence Limit ✓
2. Products-Completed Operations Aggregate
3. Personal and Advertising Injury Limit
4. General Aggregate Limit

Why: The Each Occurrence Limit caps total BI and PD damages (plus medical payments) for a single occurrence.

A claimant sued obligor A in good time. The court determines on 1 June, finally, that under the priority rules A's coverage does not apply to her and that obligor B's does. The ordinary limitation period against B expired on 1 May. She sues B on 20 August.

1. She is out of time: the limitation period against obligor B ran independently of the proceedings against A, and a claimant who sues the wrong insurer bears the consequence of her choice, the section doing no more than preserving a route to the assigned claims bureau where a claim against the first obligor has failed on priority grounds; the 90-day sentence is addressed to a claim made upon the plan rather than to a fresh action against a second insurer, which is why the bureau is named in it at all and why the ordinary period is left untouched.
2. She is in time only against the assigned claims plan: the 90-day extension exists for a claimant who cannot identify a proper obligor and must fall back on the plan, and one who now knows exactly which insurer is liable is left to the ordinary period against it, which expired on 1 May; the reference to a proper obligor describes the insurer to whom the bureau will assign the claim once she has filed it rather than a defendant she may sue directly on the strength of the extension, the bureau being the gateway to a second obligor in either case.
3. She is out of time by a few days: the 90-day period runs from the date the wrong obligor DENIED the claim rather than from the date the determination became final, the section treating the denial as the event that puts the claimant on notice, and a determination that becomes final only after appeal would otherwise let a claimant sit on her hands for years before choosing a second defendant, which is the mischief the alternative limb of the section was plainly written to prevent, the denial having come long before the court's determination was made.
4. She is in time: if timely action for economic loss benefits is commenced against a reparation obligor AND BENEFITS ARE DENIED BECAUSE OF A DETERMINATION THAT THE OBLIGOR'S COVERAGE IS NOT APPLICABLE to the claimant under the PRIORITY OF APPLICABILITY OF SECURITY provisions, A CLAIM AGAINST A PROPER OBLIGOR OR THE ASSIGNED CLAIMS PLAN MAY BE MADE NOT LATER THAN 90 DAYS AFTER SUCH DETERMINATION BECOMES FINAL OR THE LAST DATE ON WHICH THE ACTION COULD OTHERWISE HAVE BEEN COMMENCED, WHICHEVER IS LATER. ✓

Why: Minn. Stat. 65B.66 is a single sentence written for exactly this situation, and its three conditions are cumulative. First, TIMELY ACTION for economic loss benefits must have been COMMENCED against a reparation obligor - she sued A in good time. Second, benefits must have been DENIED BECAUSE OF A DETERMINATION THAT THE OBLIGOR'S COVERAGE IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE CLAIMANT UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 65B.47 ON THE PRIORITY OF APPLICABILITY OF SECURITY - the denial must rest on the priority rules, not on some other ground. Third, the fresh claim must be against A PROPER OBLIGOR OR THE ASSIGNED CLAIMS PLAN; both routes are open, so she is not confined to the plan. The period is then the more generous of two: NOT LATER THAN 90 DAYS AFTER SUCH DETERMINATION BECOMES FINAL, OR THE LAST DATE ON WHICH THE ACTION COULD OTHERWISE HAVE BEEN COMMENCED, WHICHEVER IS LATER. The determination became final on 1 June, so the 90 days run to about 30 August; the ordinary period had expired on 1 May, so the later of the two is the 90-day route, and 20 August is inside it. The section is the counterpart of section 65B.47's priority scheme: a claimant who has to guess which of several securities answers is not to lose the claim by guessing wrong, provided the guess was made in time and the loss was determined on priority grounds.

The primary purpose of underwriting is to:

1. Settle claims quickly so that the insured is restored without delay
2. Investigate suspected fraud after a loss has already been reported
3. Select and classify risks to determine acceptability and proper pricing ✓
4. Sell as many policies as possible to spread the insurer's fixed costs

Why: Underwriting is the process of evaluating, selecting, classifying, and pricing risks to maintain a profitable book of business.

An insured with underinsured motorist limits of $50,000 is injured by a driver carrying $100,000 of bodily injury liability cover, which is paid in full. Her damages are $400,000. Her insurer says that because the at-fault limit was twice her own, the at-fault vehicle cannot have been underinsured as against her.

1. Nothing is payable: a vehicle is underinsured only in relation to the claimant's own underinsured motorist limit, so a driver carrying twice the cover she bought cannot be an underinsured motorist as against her; her remedy for the balance of a loss of this size lies against the at-fault driver personally, in the same way as it would for any claimant whose damages exceed every policy in sight.
2. $50,000 is payable: the at-fault vehicle is underinsured because ITS LIMIT FOR BODILY INJURY LIABILITY IS LESS THAN THE AMOUNT NEEDED TO COMPENSATE THE INSURED FOR ACTUAL DAMAGES, the maximum liability is the damages sustained but not recovered from that policy - $300,000 - and IN NO EVENT SHALL THE UNDERINSURED MOTORIST CARRIER HAVE TO PAY MORE THAN THE AMOUNT OF ITS UNDERINSURED MOTORIST LIMITS. ✓
3. $100,000 is payable: the coverage responds up to the limit carried by the at-fault vehicle, that being the measure of the shortfall the underinsured motorist coverage exists to make good, and the claimant's own scheduled limit sets a floor rather than a ceiling wherever the at-fault driver turns out to have carried the larger figure.
4. $300,000 is payable: the maximum liability is the damages sustained but not recovered from the at-fault policy, and the sentence capping payment at the carrier's own limits governs the multiple-vehicle case dealt with immediately before it rather than imposing a general ceiling on a claim arising out of one at-fault vehicle.

Why: Two provisions, and the insurer's argument fails on the first. Minn. Stat. 65B.43, subd. 17 defines an UNDERINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE as one TO WHICH A BODILY INJURY LIABILITY POLICY APPLIES AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT BUT ITS LIMIT FOR BODILY INJURY LIABILITY IS LESS THAN THE AMOUNT NEEDED TO COMPENSATE THE INSURED FOR ACTUAL DAMAGES. The comparison the definition makes is between the at-fault limit and the claimant's ACTUAL DAMAGES. It is not a comparison between the at-fault limit and the claimant's own underinsured motorist limit, which is the rule some other states use and the reading the insurer is pressing here. $100,000 is less than $400,000, so the vehicle is underinsured however modest the claimant's own coverage may be. Minn. Stat. 65B.49, subd. 4a then does the arithmetic in two steps. Maximum liability is THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES SUSTAINED BUT NOT RECOVERED FROM THE INSURANCE POLICY OF THE DRIVER OR OWNER OF ANY UNDERINSURED AT FAULT VEHICLE: $400,000 less the $100,000 paid is $300,000. Then the ceiling: IN NO EVENT SHALL THE UNDERINSURED MOTORIST CARRIER HAVE TO PAY MORE THAN THE AMOUNT OF ITS UNDERINSURED MOTORIST LIMITS. Her limit is $50,000, so $50,000 is payable. A claimant who buys a small underinsured motorist limit gets a small recovery - but she does get one, and that is the point the insurer's argument would have taken away entirely.

For Homeowners eligibility, a dwelling that the insured does not currently live in but intends to return to with belongings still present is best described as:

1. Vacant
2. Unoccupied ✓
3. Abandoned
4. Under construction

Why: Unoccupied means no one is living there temporarily but personal property remains; vacant means both empty of people and substantially empty of contents.

A house is insured with the loss payable to a named mortgagee. The owner deliberately sets the fire. The insurer wants to cancel the mortgagee's interest, and asks whether it owes the mortgagee anything, on what notice, and what it gets if it pays.

1. It owes the mortgagee nothing: the mortgagee's rights are derivative of the insured's, and an owner who destroys the property destroys the claim for everyone with an interest in it, the mortgagee's remedy being against the owner on the debt.
2. It owes the mortgagee the full amount and may cancel the interest on 30 days' notice, taking an assignment of the mortgage: the standard mortgage clause protects the mortgagee against the owner's acts, and the cancellation period matches the period for cancelling the policy itself, since the mortgagee's interest cannot be ended more quickly than the cover it depends on.
3. It owes the mortgagee, may cancel that interest on TEN DAYS' written notice, and takes an assignment if it pays in full: NO ACT OR DEFAULT OF ANY PERSON OTHER THAN SUCH MORTGAGEE OR VENDOR OR THE MORTGAGEE'S OR VENDOR'S AGENT shall render the policy void as to the mortgagee; if loss is made payable to a designated mortgagee or contract for deed vendor NOT NAMED AS INSURED, that interest MAY BE CANCELED BY GIVING TEN DAYS' WRITTEN NOTICE; the mortgagee SHALL ON DEMAND PAY according to the established scale of rates FOR ANY INCREASE OF RISKS NOT PAID FOR BY THE INSURED; and if the company elects to pay the FULL AMOUNT SECURED, THE MORTGAGEE SHALL ASSIGN AND TRANSFER ITS INTEREST in the mortgage together with the note and debts secured. ✓
4. It owes the mortgagee and may not cancel that interest at all while the debt is outstanding: the provisions relating to mortgagee interests are the ones the section forbids an insurer to alter, which shows that they are intended to survive anything the insurer or the owner does; the mortgagee is protected against the owner's act, must pay for any increase of risk on demand, and assigns the mortgage on payment, but the insurer's only route out is to cancel the policy as a whole. That is why the subdivision requires the mortgagee provisions to be incorporated without change into any package policy written in place of the standard form: a protection the insurer can end on ten days' notice would be no protection at all to a lender advancing money on the strength of it, and the lender's interest in the property outlasts any particular policy year.

Why: The mortgagee provisions of Minn. Stat. 65A.01, subd. 3 are the ones subd. 1 says must be INCORPORATED WITHOUT CHANGE into any package policy written in place of the standard form, which is a fair measure of how seriously the statute takes them. Three sentences do the work. Cancellation of the interest: IF LOSS HEREUNDER IS MADE PAYABLE, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, TO A DESIGNATED MORTGAGEE OR CONTRACT FOR DEED VENDOR NOT NAMED HEREIN AS INSURED, SUCH INTEREST IN THIS POLICY MAY BE CANCELED BY GIVING TO SUCH MORTGAGEE OR VENDOR A TEN DAYS' WRITTEN NOTICE OF CANCELLATION. Ten days, and it is the interest that is cancelled rather than the policy. Protection against the owner: NOTWITHSTANDING ANY OTHER PROVISIONS OF THIS POLICY, if the policy is made payable to a mortgagee or contract for deed vendor of the covered real estate, NO ACT OR DEFAULT OF ANY PERSON OTHER THAN SUCH MORTGAGEE OR VENDOR OR THE MORTGAGEE'S OR VENDOR'S AGENT OR THOSE CLAIMING UNDER THE MORTGAGEE OR VENDOR, WHETHER THE SAME OCCURS BEFORE OR DURING THE TERM OF THIS POLICY, SHALL RENDER THIS POLICY VOID AS TO SUCH MORTGAGEE OR VENDOR NOR AFFECT SUCH MORTGAGEE'S OR VENDOR'S RIGHT TO RECOVER IN CASE OF LOSS. The owner's arson is exactly the case it is written for. Two conditions come with it: the mortgagee SHALL ON DEMAND PAY ACCORDING TO THE ESTABLISHED SCALE OF RATES FOR ANY INCREASE OF RISKS NOT PAID FOR BY THE INSURED; and WHENEVER THIS COMPANY SHALL BE LIABLE TO A MORTGAGEE OR VENDOR FOR ANY SUM FOR LOSS UNDER THIS POLICY FOR WHICH NO LIABILITY EXISTS AS TO THE MORTGAGOR, VENDEE, OR OWNER, AND THIS COMPANY SHALL ELECT BY ITSELF, OR WITH OTHERS, TO PAY THE MORTGAGEE OR VENDOR THE FULL AMOUNT SECURED, THEN THE MORTGAGEE OR VENDOR SHALL ASSIGN AND TRANSFER TO THE COMPANY THE MORTGAGEE'S OR VENDOR'S INTEREST, UPON SUCH PAYMENT, IN THE SAID MORTGAGE OR CONTRACT FOR DEED TOGETHER WITH THE NOTE AND DEBTS THEREBY SECURED. Section 65A.11 adds that where the loss is payable to more than one mortgagee the company pays IN THE ORDER OF PRIORITY to the extent of its liability.

An insured runs a small in-home daycare for several children. The appropriate way to address the liability and incidental property exposure is the:

1. Mortgage clause, which extends the policy's protection to everyone lawfully on the premises
2. Home Day Care / business pursuits-type endorsement ✓
3. Inflation guard endorsement, raising the limits as the number of children enrolled grows
4. Personal Injury endorsement, which covers bodily injury to children left in the insured's care

Why: A home day care endorsement (a form of permitted incidental occupancy/business endorsement) addresses the liability and limited property exposure of running a daycare from the home.

An insurer wants to cancel mid-term four policies covering buildings used for residential purposes, each in force more than 60 days: one for nonpayment; one because the insured stopped paying dues to a lake association through which the cover was obtained; one because the roof has collapsed and been left unrepaired; and one on a motel.

1. Only the nonpayment cancellation is available: the printed cancellation form applies to every policy on buildings used for residential purposes that has been in effect for at least 60 days, and nonpayment of premium is the one ground in the form that is unqualified, the remaining grounds all requiring conduct amounting to misrepresentation or fraud made by or with the knowledge of the insured; physical changes in the property become a ground only where the insured has brought them about deliberately, and nonpayment of dues to a lake association is the act of a third party rather than of the insured, so neither will support a mid-term cancellation of a policy this old.
2. All four cancellations are available: the printed form lists the reasons an insurer must state in its notice of cancellation rather than the reasons it is confined to, so an insurer that gives one of them has satisfied the form and an insurer with another reason may still cancel on 30 days' notice; and a motel is a building used for residential purposes in the ordinary sense of the words, its guests residing there for as long as they stay, so the motel policy is inside the limitation and may be cancelled on the same grounds as the other three without the plan of the section being disturbed. Nothing in the subdivision says that the five reasons it prints are exhaustive of an insurer's right to end a contract it no longer wishes to carry.
3. The first three are available and the motel is outside the limitation altogether: the form applies WHEN THIS POLICY HAS BEEN ISSUED TO COVER BUILDINGS USED FOR RESIDENTIAL PURPOSES OTHER THAN A HOTEL OR MOTEL AND HAS BEEN IN EFFECT FOR AT LEAST 60 DAYS, OR IF IT HAS BEEN RENEWED, and its grounds include NONPAYMENT OF PREMIUM; PHYSICAL CHANGES IN THE INSURED PROPERTY WHICH ARE NOT CORRECTED OR RESTORED WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME AND WHICH RESULT IN THE PROPERTY BECOMING UNINSURABLE; and NONPAYMENT OF DUES TO AN ASSOCIATION OR ORGANIZATION, OTHER THAN AN INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, WHERE PAYMENT OF DUES IS A PREREQUISITE to obtaining or continuing the insurance. ✓
4. The first and third are available, the dues cancellation is not, and the motel is inside the limitation: the form covers every building used for residential purposes and a motel houses residents; and a dues ground would let a third party end an insurance contract by its own decision to expel a member, which is why the ground appears in the automobile provisions, where the insured chooses the association, and not in the fire policy form, where the association is usually the seller of the cover. A hotel or motel is in any event a building in which people reside, and a form that turned on the label attached to the premises rather than on what happens inside them would be simple to evade by renaming the building.

Why: Minn. Stat. 65A.01, subd. 3a is the source of the homeowner's cancellation grounds that section 65A.29, subd. 1 borrows, and it is written as a form the insurer must print. Its opening words carry three conditions: WHEN THIS POLICY HAS BEEN ISSUED TO COVER BUILDINGS USED FOR RESIDENTIAL PURPOSES OTHER THAN A HOTEL OR MOTEL AND HAS BEEN IN EFFECT FOR AT LEAST 60 DAYS, OR IF IT HAS BEEN RENEWED, THIS POLICY SHALL NOT BE CANCELED, EXCEPT FOR ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING REASONS WHICH SHALL BE STATED IN THE NOTICE OF CANCELLATION. A hotel or motel is excluded by name, and a policy less than 60 days old that has not been renewed is outside the limitation - the same underwriting-period idea section 65B.15, subd. 2 uses on the automobile side. The five grounds: (a) NONPAYMENT OF PREMIUM; (b) MISREPRESENTATION OR FRAUD MADE BY OR WITH THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE INSURED IN OBTAINING THE POLICY OR IN PURSUING A CLAIM THEREUNDER; (c) AN ACT OR OMISSION OF THE INSURED WHICH MATERIALLY INCREASES THE RISK ORIGINALLY ACCEPTED; (d) PHYSICAL CHANGES IN THE INSURED PROPERTY WHICH ARE NOT CORRECTED OR RESTORED WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME AFTER THEY OCCUR AND WHICH RESULT IN THE PROPERTY BECOMING UNINSURABLE; and (e) NONPAYMENT OF DUES TO AN ASSOCIATION OR ORGANIZATION, OTHER THAN AN INSURANCE ASSOCIATION OR ORGANIZATION, WHERE PAYMENT OF DUES IS A PREREQUISITE TO OBTAINING OR CONTINUING THE INSURANCE. Two provisos follow. The limitation DOES NOT APPLY TO ADDITIONAL COVERAGES IN A DIVISIBLE POLICY, other than a policy of fire and extended coverage insurance, and where the company cancels those it may issue a new separate fire policy at a pro rata premium for the remaining period. And clause (1)(e) SHALL NOT BE INCLUDED IN THE LANGUAGE OF THE POLICY OR ENDORSEMENT UNLESS the payment of such dues is in fact a prerequisite - the ground may not be printed speculatively.

The Business Auto physical damage coverage offers which coverage categories?

1. Workers compensation for drivers injured on the job
2. Comprehensive, specified causes of loss, and collision ✓
3. Uninsured motorists coverage written on a per-vehicle basis
4. Liability, medical payments, and garagekeepers legal liability

Why: BACF physical damage can be written as Comprehensive, Specified Causes of Loss (a narrower named-peril option), and Collision.

A passenger is injured by an uninsured driver while riding in a colleague's car. She is not an insured under the colleague's policy, which carries uninsured motorist limits of $50,000. Her own policy lists two cars, each with uninsured motorist limits of $150,000. Her damages are $200,000.

1. $50,000: the limit available to a person occupying a motor vehicle is the limit specified for that vehicle, and the excess insurance protection opens only where the occupied car carries no uninsured motorist coverage at all, so a passenger hurt in a car insured for $50,000 is confined to that figure.
2. $150,000: the excess insurance protection is LIMITED TO THE EXTENT OF COVERED DAMAGES SUSTAINED and is AVAILABLE ONLY TO THE EXTENT BY WHICH THE LIMIT OF LIABILITY FOR LIKE COVERAGE APPLICABLE TO ANY ONE MOTOR VEHICLE listed on the policy of which the injured person is an insured EXCEEDS THE LIMIT OF LIABILITY OF THE COVERAGE AVAILABLE FROM THE OCCUPIED MOTOR VEHICLE - $50,000 from the occupied car, plus the $100,000 by which one of her own vehicles' limits exceeds it. ✓
3. $200,000: the excess insurance protection makes up the shortfall between the limit available from the occupied car and the claimant's covered damages, the provision existing to put a passenger where she would have been had she been driving her own car; her policy carries $150,000 on each of two vehicles, so there is like coverage enough to absorb the whole of a $200,000 loss once the colleague's $50,000 has been applied to it, and the clause caps the recovery at her damages rather than at any one scheduled limit.
4. $350,000, reduced to her damages of $200,000: the occupied car's $50,000 is available first, and the excess is then measured against the limits carried on her policy as a whole rather than against any one vehicle, because the clause speaks of the POLICY of which the injured person is an insured and a policy insuring two cars for $150,000 each carries $300,000 of like coverage; the only ceiling on the calculation is her actual loss, nothing in the wording confining the comparison to a single scheduled vehicle where the policy itself is the thing the provision names.

Why: Minn. Stat. 65B.49, subd. 3a, clause (5) supplies the arithmetic in two conditions, and both have to be applied. The gateway first: the injured person must be OCCUPYING A MOTOR VEHICLE OF WHICH THE INJURED PERSON IS NOT AN INSURED. She is a passenger in a colleague's car and is not an insured under it, so the excess route is open. Then the measure: THE EXCESS INSURANCE PROTECTION IS LIMITED TO THE EXTENT OF COVERED DAMAGES SUSTAINED, AND FURTHER IS AVAILABLE ONLY TO THE EXTENT BY WHICH THE LIMIT OF LIABILITY FOR LIKE COVERAGE APPLICABLE TO ANY ONE MOTOR VEHICLE LISTED ON THE AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE POLICY OF WHICH THE INJURED PERSON IS AN INSURED EXCEEDS THE LIMIT OF LIABILITY OF THE COVERAGE AVAILABLE TO THE INJURED PERSON FROM THE OCCUPIED MOTOR VEHICLE. ANY ONE MOTOR VEHICLE is the phrase that defeats the largest figure on offer: the comparison is with the limit on one of her vehicles, $150,000, and not with the two of them added together, which clause (6) forbids in terms. $150,000 less the occupied vehicle's $50,000 is $100,000 of excess, on top of the $50,000 itself, giving $150,000. LIKE COVERAGE matters too - uninsured motorist limits are compared with uninsured motorist limits. Her damages of $200,000 exceed the total available, so the first condition, COVERED DAMAGES SUSTAINED, does not cut anything down here; it would if her damages had been $120,000, in which case she would recover $120,000.

An insurer writes a four-month automobile policy and, at its end, simply lets it run out without notice. It also has a policy on its books with no fixed expiration date. It says neither arrangement involves a renewal, so the nonrenewal notice rules cannot apply.

1. The argument fails for both: ANY POLICY WITH A POLICY PERIOD OR TERM OF LESS THAN SIX MONTHS OR ANY POLICY WITH NO FIXED EXPIRATION DATE SHALL, FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECTIONS 65B.14 TO 65B.21, BE CONSIDERED AS IF WRITTEN FOR SUCCESSIVE POLICY PERIODS OR TERMS OF SIX MONTHS; and RENEWAL means the issuance and delivery by an insurer of a policy SUPERSEDING at the end of the policy period a policy previously issued and delivered BY THE SAME INSURER ON THE SAME RATING PLAN, or the issuance and delivery of a certificate or notice EXTENDING THE TERM of a policy beyond its policy period. ✓
2. The argument succeeds for the four-month policy and fails for the open-ended one: a term shorter than six months is too brief to attract the protection, which is why the definition fixes six months as the reference period, while a policy with no fixed expiration date runs indefinitely and can be brought to an end only by a nonrenewal on 60 days' notice.
3. The argument fails for the four-month policy and succeeds for the open-ended one: a policy with no fixed expiration date never reaches the end of a policy period, so there is nothing for a later policy to supersede and no term for a certificate to extend, and a notice of intention not to renew has nothing to attach to.
4. The argument succeeds for both: a renewal is the issuance and delivery of a policy or of a certificate extending a term, so an insurer that issues nothing has not failed to renew but has let a contract expire on its own terms; the deeming provision is a rating rule fixing the period over which premium is earned rather than a rule about notice. Sections 65B.14 to 65B.21 separate the insurer that ends a contract before its time, which is a cancellation needing a listed ground, from the one that declines to make a new contract, and a policy that has run out has done neither.

Why: Minn. Stat. 65B.14, subd. 3 defines RENEWAL and then closes the gap the definition would otherwise leave. The definition itself has two branches: the issuance and delivery by an insurer of a policy SUPERSEDING AT THE END OF THE POLICY PERIOD a policy previously issued and delivered BY THE SAME INSURER ON THE SAME RATING PLAN, or the issuance and delivery of a CERTIFICATE OR NOTICE EXTENDING THE TERM of a policy beyond its policy period or term. Both branches require the same insurer, and the first requires the same rating plan, which is why an offer on materially different terms is not a renewal. Then the proviso: ANY POLICY WITH A POLICY PERIOD OR TERM OF LESS THAN SIX MONTHS OR ANY POLICY WITH NO FIXED EXPIRATION DATE SHALL FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECTIONS 65B.14 TO 65B.21 BE CONSIDERED AS IF WRITTEN FOR SUCCESSIVE POLICY PERIODS OR TERMS OF SIX MONTHS. Its purpose is exactly the argument the insurer is making: without it, an insurer could write short or open-ended terms and claim there was never a policy period to renew at the end of. The deemed six-month periods give both policies a policy period, and with it the 60 days' notice section 65B.17 requires.

The Spoilage endorsement primarily covers:

1. Theft of packaged inventory from a walk-in cooler
2. Damage to the building's refrigeration room structure
3. Spoilage of perishable stock due to power outages or equipment breakdown ✓
4. Liability for customer illness caused by contaminated food sold

Why: The Spoilage endorsement covers loss to perishable stock from breakdown of refrigeration equipment or off-premises power interruption, depending on options selected.

A single limit of insurance covering multiple items or multiple locations under one amount is:

1. Specific insurance
2. Scheduled insurance
3. Blanket insurance ✓
4. Valued insurance

Why: Blanket insurance applies a single limit across multiple properties, items, or locations rather than assigning separate limits.

When an insurer's actions lead an insured to believe a right exists, and the insurer is later prevented from denying that the right exists, the legal principle is:

1. Indemnity
2. Estoppel ✓
3. Subrogation
4. Waiver

Why: Estoppel prevents a party from asserting a right or fact inconsistent with a previous position when another party has relied on that position.

An insurer incorporated in the state where it is transacting business is classified as:

1. Alien
2. Domestic ✓
3. Foreign
4. Reciprocal

Why: A domestic insurer is one organized under the laws of the state in which it is doing business.

A man takes his estranged brother's car without asking and crashes it, believing wrongly but honestly that a standing family arrangement entitled him to use it. A second man knowingly steals a car and is injured; he is an insured under his own auto policy. A third is killed in a stolen car and leaves dependants.

1. All three are wholly disqualified: conversion is a disqualifying act however the converter came to take the vehicle, the good faith proviso reaching a person who had permission and exceeded its scope rather than one who had none at all, and the disqualification runs against every source of benefits including the converter's own insurer and the survivors of a converter who dies of his injuries.
2. The first is not disqualified, the second recovers only under his own policy, and the third's survivors recover only under his own policy: A PERSON WHO CONVERTS A MOTOR VEHICLE IS DISQUALIFIED from basic or optional economic loss benefits, INCLUDING BENEFITS OTHERWISE DUE AS A SURVIVOR, FROM ANY SOURCE OTHER THAN AN INSURANCE CONTRACT UNDER WHICH THE CONVERTER IS AN INSURED, for injuries arising from maintenance or use of the converted vehicle; if the converter dies, SURVIVORS ARE NOT ENTITLED to those benefits FROM ANY SOURCE OTHER THAN a contract under which the converter is a basic economic loss insured; and A PERSON IS NOT A CONVERTER IF THAT PERSON USES THE VEHICLE IN THE GOOD FAITH BELIEF THAT THE PERSON IS LEGALLY ENTITLED TO DO SO. ✓
3. The first is not disqualified and the other two are wholly disqualified: the exception for a contract under which the converter is an insured describes the converted vehicle's own policy in the case where the converter happens to be a household member of its owner, and not a separate policy of the converter's own.
4. The first and second are not disqualified and the third's survivors recover in full: an honest belief defeats conversion as described, and a converter who is himself insured has paid for coverage that answers wherever he is injured, so the disqualification never operates against a man with a policy of his own; survivors take under the deceased's policy on the same footing, the reference to a basic economic loss insured identifying which coverage responds; the disqualification is aimed at the owner of the converted vehicle, whose security should not answer for a thief; the closing sentence about a good faith belief points the same way, since a section aimed at the vehicle's own security has no reason to reach the honest taker at all.

Why: Minn. Stat. 65B.58 is one paragraph and it is carefully limited. A person who CONVERTS a motor vehicle is disqualified from basic or optional economic loss benefits, INCLUDING BENEFITS OTHERWISE DUE AS A SURVIVOR, FROM ANY SOURCE OTHER THAN AN INSURANCE CONTRACT UNDER WHICH THE CONVERTER IS AN INSURED, for injuries arising from maintenance or use of the converted vehicle. The disqualification is therefore partial: it strips the converter of recourse to the converted vehicle's security and to any other source, but leaves intact the coverage he bought himself. If the converter DIES from the injuries, survivors are not entitled to those benefits FROM ANY SOURCE OTHER THAN an insurance contract under which the converter is a basic economic loss insured - the same carve-out, passed to the survivors. And the closing sentence removes the honest taker altogether: FOR THE PURPOSE OF THIS SECTION, A PERSON IS NOT A CONVERTER IF THAT PERSON USES THE MOTOR VEHICLE IN THE GOOD FAITH BELIEF THAT THE PERSON IS LEGALLY ENTITLED TO DO SO. The brother's honest, if mistaken, belief takes him outside the section entirely. Two neighbouring disqualifications work the same way but are absolute rather than partial: section 65B.59 disqualifies a person injured in the course of an OFFICIAL RACING CONTEST - other than a rally held in whole or in part on public roads - or in practice or preparation for one, with survivors likewise excluded; and section 65B.51, subd. 2 preserves a negligence action for economic loss not payable because of an exclusion under sections 65B.58 to 65B.60.

Three people ask whether they are agents for the purposes of the involuntary termination review scheme. One is an employee of the insurer with a seven-year record. One has held an agency contract for two years and writes 95 percent of her business through the insurer. One has held an agency contract for six years but places only half her business with the insurer.

1. None of them is: an agent for these purposes is one who is NOT an employee of the insurer, whose agency contractual relationship has been in effect for five or more years, and who writes 80 percent or more of the agent's business through one insurer or its subsidiaries - each of the three fails one of those requirements. ✓
2. The third is and the others are not: the five-year requirement and the non-employee requirement are cumulative, but the 80 percent test is an alternative to the five-year test rather than a further condition, so an agent of long standing qualifies whatever proportion of business she places.
3. The second is and the others are not: the definition is directed at agents economically dependent on a single insurer, so the proportion of business is the operative test and the reference to five years describes the period over which the proportion is measured rather than any minimum duration of the relationship itself.
4. None of them is, and the definition is narrower still: it also requires the insurer to be an insurance company writing LIFE OR HEALTH insurance in this state through agents, the review scheme having been made for the life and health market where exclusive agency is the norm.

Why: Minn. Stat. 60A.176 subd. 3 defines “agent”, for that section and for section 60A.177, as “an agent who is not an employee of the insurer, who has an agency contractual relationship that has been in effect for five or more years, and who writes 80 percent or more of the agent's business through one insurer or its subsidiaries”. The three requirements are joined by “and”, so all must hold - which is what the second and third options each convert into alternatives. The employee fails the first, the two-year agent fails the second, and the agent placing half her business fails the third. Subdivision 4 defines “insurer” as “an insurance company writing property or casualty loss insurance in this state through agents” - property and casualty, not life or health, so the fourth option has the market the wrong way round. Subdivision 1 confines the definitions to sections 60A.176 and 60A.177, and subdivision 2 is repealed.

A casualty insurer submits, in one package, rates and rules for one line of insurance; separately, three companies in its group each submit an identical policy form. It also submits a notice that it will not adopt a rate service organisation filing, and a schedule of workers' compensation rates.

1. Rates and rules submitted together attract a single $10 fee, and the schedule of workers' compensation rates attracts another; but simultaneous identical filings by insurers within one group or fleet are consolidated and charged as a single filing, one fee covering all three companies, and a notice of nonadoption of a rate service organisation filing withdraws from a filing rather than making one, so it falls outside the six items listed in the part and attracts nothing.
2. All four attract fees, but the rates and the rules attract two between them: the single-fee concession in the part is confined to policy forms and endorsements pertaining to the same kind of insurance, so $10 is payable on the rate filing and a further $10 on the rules filing however they are packaged, while the three group filings, the nonadoption and the workers' compensation schedule each attract a fee of their own.
3. Rates and rules submitted together attract a single $10 fee and the three identical group filings attract separate fees; but a nonadoption of a rate service or data service organisation filing, like a change of effective date, sits outside the six listed items and attracts nothing, and workers' compensation rate schedules are exempt from these fees altogether, being handled through the workers' compensation ratemaking process rather than under the property and casualty filing fee rules.
4. Rates and rules pertaining to the same kind or line and submitted together attract a single $10 fee; the three identical group filings attract separate fees; a nonadoption of a rate service or data service organisation filing attracts a fee; and a workers' compensation schedule of rates is among the listed workers' compensation filings that attract fees. ✓

Why: Minn. R. 2605.0200 applies a $10 filing fee to filings of rates, rules, policies or endorsements relating to casualty or property insurance, and then sets out six items. A: “Rates and rules pertaining to the same kind or line of insurance and submitted together are subject to a single filing fee” - so the concession does cover rates and rules, which is what the third option moves to forms and endorsements alone; B does the same for policy forms and endorsements pertaining to the same kind of insurance. C: “Simultaneous identical filings by other insurers within a group or fleet of companies are subject to SEPARATE filing fees” - the opposite of the second option's reading. D: “Deviations from, including effective date change, or nonadoption of, rate service or data service organization filings are subject to filing fees”, which disposes of the second and fourth options on that point. E brings in Minnesota Automobile Insurance Plan and FAIR Plan filings. F lists seven workers' compensation filings that attract fees, the first of which is a schedule of rates - so they are not exempt, as the fourth option supposes.